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ABSTRACT 
HUMAN FACTORS IN DIVING 
Dive safety is primarily a function of four factors: the environment, equipment, 
individual diver performance and dive team performance. The water is a harsh and 
alien environment which can impose severe physical and psychological stress on a 
diver. The remaining factors must be controlled and coordinated so the diver can 
overcome the stresses imposed by the underwater environment and work safely. 
Diving equipment is crucial because it provides life support to the diver, but the 
majority of dive accidents are caused by individual diver panic and an associated 
degradation of the individual diver's performance. This paper investigates the factors 
which influence human performance and behavior, and focuses on divers working 
underwater. Recommendations are offered on how to improve dive safety through 
knowledge and awareness of human factors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The importance of human factors in diving. 
Human error is inevitable (Reason, 1990). Nobody's perfect. Everyone makes mistakes. 
Fortunately, most of our errors are minor and do not cause significant harm. 
Unfortunately, modern technology and hazardous environments often magnify the 
consequences of human errors and the results can be catastrophic. Human error in a 
high tech environment has been the primary cause of the modern era's most severe 
accidents. Consider the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant disaster, where a series 
of operator errors allowed a complex and highly technical system to run amuck, or the 
Exxon Valdez, a good ship that ran aground due to human error. Examples of human 
error leading to accidents are almost limitless (Perrow, 1984). 
The study of human factors seeks to improve safety by reducing the frequency of 
human error and mitigating the consequences of human error when it occurs. Human 
behavior is far too complicated and unpredictable to ever eliminate human error, but 
by understanding howand why humans make errors we can dramatically improve 
safety. Human error is the direct cause of 60% to 80% of all accidents (Perrow, 1984). 
In the maritime industry, approximately 80% of all accidents are attributable to human 
error (Bea,l 995). Consequently, many of the major maritime organizations, such as 
the U.S. Coast Guard, American Bureau of Shipping, and the Mobil Shipping & 
Transportation Company, are placing greater emphasis on human factors (American 
Bureau of Shipping, 1996). The U.S. Coast Guard recently launched it's Prevention 
Through People program that "recognizes the human element as occupying a critical 
role in maritime safety" (Card, 1996). 
In diving, human error can have catastrophic consequences. A recent study from the 
University of Wisconsin indicates that over half of all divers surveyed experienced 
panic underwater sometime during their diving career (Morgan, 1995). Morgan's 
findings were recently corroborated by an independent survey of recreational divers 
that indicated 65 percent of divers have panicked under water (Staff, 1996). Panic 
can lead to errors in a diver's judgment or performance, resulting in an accident. Since 
a diver is immersed in a harsh environment and relies on technical equipment for life 
support, the consequences oi a dive accident can be severe. Experts agree that human 
error and panic are the leading causes of dive accidents and fatalities (Brown, 1982; 
Elliott, 1984; Bachrach & Egstrom, 1987; Morgan, 1995, 1987; Shelanski, 1996; 
Vorosmarti, 1987). 
2. OVERVIEW OF HUMAN FACTORS 
Safety is a direct function of human performance, and can be promoted by reducing 
the frequency and impact of human error. To combat human error, it is necessary to 
understand how and why people commit errors. The study of human factors (HF) 
categorizes how errors occur and defines influences on humans that explain why 
errors occur. This paper focuses on human factors in diving and investigates how and 
why divers commit errors and panic. Human factors are defined as the complex 
system of influences which shape human behavior, and the resultant effects that 
human performance exerts on a system or process. The goal of this paper is the 
promotion of dive safety through increased awareness and accounting of human 
factors in diving. This section introduces the concept of human factors, describes how 
and why errors occur, how accidents evolve from errors, and strategies to combat 
error. 
Human Error 
Human error can be defined as an individual's deviation from acceptable or desirable 
practice which culminates in undesirable or unexpected results (Bea, 1994). An eiTor 
can prevent a plan from achieving its desired outcome. 
Errors come in many forms, so it is helpful to categorize how errors occur. Several 
researchers have proposed categories for human error. Reason (1996, 1990) 
categorizes how errors occur by studying what causes plans to fail. If the plan is good 
but execution is not, then the failure is due to slips, lapses, trips or fumbles. If the plan 
itself is faulty, then the failure is due to a mistake. If established procedures or 
regulations are purposefully ignored, then the mistake can be further defined as a 
violation. 
Reason's (1996) error categories are related to three levels of human performance: 
skill-based, rale-based and knowledge-based. The key features of these performance 
levels are summarized below: 
• At the skill-based performance level, people carry out routine, highly-practiced 
tasks in a largely automatic fashion, except for occasional conscious progress 
checks. Driving a car is a common example. 
• If these automatic responses must be modified, then people switch to the rule- 
based performance level. It is called 'rule-based' because people apply memorized 
performance patterns or rules that state 'If (this situation), then do (these actions).' 
The situation is often one that has been encountered before, and perceptions of the 
situation are used to select an appropriate pre-patterned solution from memory. 
Potential solutions are developed through training, experience or education and are 
stored in memory. Solutions are selected automatically, but conscious thought is 
used to verify that the solution is appropriate. An example of rale-based 
performance could be driving a rental car where the controls are in a different 
location, but the basic operating rales still apply. 
• The knowledge-based performance level is reached only when pre-patterned 
solutions from memory fail to match the given situation. Knowledge-based 
performance is slow, laborious and highly error-prone. Given good resources 
(information/fools, time, etc.), people can often develop good solutions. In the real 
world, however, people are often faced with limited resources, especially during 
emergencies, and well-reasoned responses are too often replaced with 
inappropriate and unsuccessful reactions. Continuing the rental car example, 
knowledge-based performance is necessaiy to navigate through a new city. 
Three error mechanisms can now be defined. This is an important step because it 
correlates the error categories (e.g. , slips) with human performance levels (Reason, 
1996). 
•    Skill-based slips,, lapses, trips and fumbles, where the plan is good but execution is 
not. For example, a fender-bender may be the result of a driver's lapse in attention. 
• Rule-based mistakes where, someone misapplies a good rale, applies a bad rale, or 
fails to apply a good rale.  (Violations are a sub-category of mistakes that are 
elaborated below.) For example, a fender-bender which results from 
unsuccessfully speeding through a yellow light. 
• Knowledge-based mistakes where an individual makes a cognitive error in an 
attempt to think through a new problem or situation. For example, getting lost 
while driving in a new city. », 
Violations axe. a special category of mistakes where somebody fails to apply a good rule, 
or deviates from acceptable or desirable practice. Reason (1996) identifies four 
categories of violations: 
• Routine violations, which involve cutting corners, or taking short cuts. 
• Violations 'for kicks', where rules are broken to prove machismo or to alleviate 
boredom. 
• Necessary violations, when the rules prevent people from performing their jobs. 
• Exceptional violations, which usually are the result of extreme emotions. 
The tendency to violate rules is a function of age and gender: Most young men tend to 
violate rules while most older women do not. It is important to recognize that while 
rule violations are a function of age and gender, error proneness is not. Men and 
women, old or young, do not show a marked differences in error proneness (Reason, 
1996). 
Reason's error mechanisms explain the psychological basis that causes errors, but these 
mechanisms are not readily observable. Bea (1996) offers a breakdown of human 
error categories which emphasize observable behavior. This is important because 
errors must be recognized and acknowledged before they can be corrected. Bea's 
categories are also useful during accident investigations. Many investigations conclude 
that the accident was simply caused by "human error" ("Human error", 1996). It is 
necessary to define error further as an observable behavior which can be 
acknowledged, and then reduced or eliminated. This is an essential step in accident 
investigations if we .are to learn from past accidents. Bea's categories of human error 












Table 1: Categories of Human Errors (from Bea, 1996) 
Error categories define how an accident occurred and can help prevent future 
accidents under similar circumstances. Accident prevention, however, demands that 
we understand both how errors occur and why Why do people slip, lapse, fumble, 
make mistakes, and violate rules? Why do people commit errors? Understanding why 
errors occur will allow proactive identification of conditions that cause errors and have 
the potential to cause accidents. 
Human Factors 
The study of human factors (HF) analyzes the complex system of influences which 
shape human behavior and explains why errors occur. Figure 1 illustrates the factors 
that are present in eveiy system (e.g., a ship at sea, a hospital operating room, or a dive 
team). These factors influence the system's performance.   The individual is at the core 
of the model because every system is designed, programmed, operated and repaired by 
people (Card, 1996). Moreover, people are responsible for the majority of accidents, 
and they are the key to accident prevention (Bea, 1996). The factors surrounding the 
individual influence his or her behavior and performance, both positively and 
negatively. The interactions between the factors, represented by the lines between 
boxes, also significantly influences the individual and each of the other factors. Each 
factor is defined below. 
Equipment 
Environment Individual Organization 
Procedures 
Figure 1: Factors and interfaces that influence system performance (from Bea, 1995) 
• Individual: Cognitive scientists who have studied human behavior have 
determined that an individual's performance is constantly influenced by a variety 
of internal and external factors, called Performance Shaping Factors (PSF)1 
(Boniface, 1996). These factors can either promote individual effectiveness or 
deter it, and thus increase or decrease the probability of human error (Boniface, 
1996). These individual performance shaping factors must be differentiated from 
the system factors shown in figure 1. System factors influence the performance of 
the entire system, which the individual is a part of. That individual is in turn 
affected by the performance shaping factors shown in table 2. The factors shown 
in figure 1 are the dominant shaping factors. Additional general categories of PSFs 
are listed in table 2. It is crucial that anyone concerned with safety recognizes that 
human performance has limits, and that it is a complex and dynamic function of 
these shaping factors. 
Change Experience      Communication Training 
Motivation      Workload       Impairment Education 
Table 2: Some Categories of Performance Shaping Factors 
(from Boniface, 1996; Reason, 1990) 
Organizational Factors: Organizational factors reflect the organization's structure, 
procedures and culture. Many researchers believe that the organizational factors 
are the dominant influences on individual performance (Bea, 1996). 
Equipment Factors: Equipment design, complexity and automation often influence 
the occurrence of human errors and their impact. Simple equipment is less likely 
to generate operator errors, while robust equipment can withstand the 
consequences of errors. Ergonomics and human factors engineering promote 
effective human-equipment interfaces. 
Environment: The work environment has a direct physical and psychological 
impact on workers. The work place may be hot or cold, loud or quiet, neat or 
1
 For further discussion of performance shaping factors, the reader is referred to Boniface and Reason. 
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cluttered, and so on. These physical factors affect an individual's ability to think 
and perform effectively. 
• Procedural Factors: Rules, regulations, directions and other forms of procedures 
guide daily activities. Well-reasoned procedures can promote efficiency and 
effectiveness, while complex or ambiguous prosedures are often a source of human 
error. 
• Interactions between factors: Each factor effects every other. For example, cold 
weather may degrade equipment performance and mandate a change to the 
planned work procedure. These interactions are often complex, unpredictable and 
obscure. Serious accidents can develop before complex interactions can be 
identified and corrected (Perrow, 1984). 
System performance is a function of all of the above factors, however, it is the human 
factor which has the dominant effect on system reliability (Bea, 1996). Therefore, it is 
important to understand how individual performance is affected by performance 
shaping factors (table 2). 
Stress 
The concept of stress explains how human performance reacts to the influences of 
performance shaping factors and why errors often occur. A noted authority on stress, 
Hans Selye, states that stress is an inevitable human condition which, if mismanaged, 
can result in distress (Brief, Schüler & Van Sell, 1981). Stress is "the result of an 
imbalance between the demands placed upon an individual and the capacity of that 
individual to respond to the demands" (McGrath, 1970). This imbalance compels an 
individual to respond or take action in order to change the situation and reduce the 
* 
stress (Potter & Perry, 1989). The stress response, or coping, process is modeled in 
figure 2. 
1. Stress 
situation         ' t 
4. Response 
performed V 
 A ' 










Figure 2: Stress response process model (From Potter & Perry, 1989)2 
The stress response model is a four-stage process linked by four individual actions: 
cognitive appraisal, decision, performance, and review. The stress response process is 
initiated by stimuli, called Stressors, which may be any or all of the factors discussed 
previously. The Stressor creates a stress situation, which is the model's first stage. The 
individual cognitively appraises the situation, comparing it to previous experiences 
with similar Stressors. Thus the individual is operating on Reason's rule -based or 
knowledge-based performance level. The perceived stress will vary dramatically 
between individuals because perception of Stressors is a learned behavior. Infants 
learn to judge whether situations are stressful by modeling parents, then peers and 
society. 
Perception of stress is also information sensitive, so the perceived stress level can often 
be reduced by reducing uncertainty, often through education and experience. Titus, a 
Stressor which one individual perceives as a 'threat', may be perceived as a 'challenge' 
by someone else. Both perceptions evoke a response, but indicate dramatically 
different levels of stress tolerance and ability to cope with the stress situation. 
Additionally, the perception of stress reflects the circumstances. For example, most 
divers would view the appearance of a shark underwater as a Stressor. If the goal of 
the dive, however, is to view sharks, then the sighting of a shark would not be a 
- Adapted from Stress and work: A managerial perspective, by John M. lvancevich and Michael T. 
Matteson. Glenview, 111. 
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Stressor (Bachrach, 1987). Thus, for a given situation, every individual will perceive 
differing levels of stress, possibly even no stress (Potter & Periy, 1989). 
Individual differences in stress perception can be evaluated using Spielberger's (1969) 
"State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)". STAI is a toc^ for measuring anxiety, or the 
feeling of uneasiness caused by stress, in adults. The STAI differentiates between the 
temporary condition of "state anxiety" and the more general and long-standing quality 
of "trait anxiety". State anxiety is a function of immediate Stressors acting upon an 
individual, and is most sensitive to information. Trait anxiety, on the other hand, 
reflects each individual's personality and is relatively constant. STAI has proven useful 
for identifying persons with high levels of neurotic anxiety and for screening such 
individuals from high stress occupations (Mind Garden, 1996) 
If stress is perceived, then the individual has entered the model's second stage. Now 
the individual must decide how to respond or cope with the Stressor. The individual 
must scan the situation, interrogate one's memory, evaluate available options, then 
choose the best course of action to respond. The individual enters the stress response 
model's third stage when a response is chosen. 
Performing the chosen response transitions to the model's fourth stage. It is important 
to recognize that the individual's ability to perform is affected by the stress situation. 
The model's final step is a conscious review of how the response affected the stress 
situation. If the response reduced the perceived stress to a tolerable level, then the 
response was successful and the process stops. If the level of stress remains high, the 
individual moves through the stress response process again and attempts a new 
response. This process can repeat indefinitely until the stress is reduced to acceptable 
levels, or excessive stress levels truncate the process and prevent further coping. 
Performance under stress 
It is important to recognize that individual performance is a function of the perceived 
stress level, as shown in figure 3. If Stressors are absent, people may be careless and 
commit careless errors that result in poor performance. On the other hand, strong 
Stressors can overwhelm capacity, causing other errors and associated poor 
performance. Peak performance occurs in a zone of optimal stress when the stress 
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demands are slightly less than an individual's capacity to respond (Bachrach, 1987). 
This zone varies for each individual and every situation. Peak performance cannot be 
maintained continuously because both demand and capacity constantly fluctuate. Note, 
however, that performance can be improved through personnel selection (Flin & 










1 Stress level 
Figure 3: Effects of stress on Human Performance (from Bea, 1996) 
Training 
Training has several benefits. As shown in figure 3, training can increase an 
individual's performance level for a given stress level. Training can also improve 
coping skills by developing response rules or templates to given stress situations. These 
templates are patterns of action which have been learned experientially and can be 
matched to future stress situation. These templates are utilized when an individual 
operates on Reason's rule-based performance level. If a suitable template matches a 
given situation, then the individual does not have to go through a long and error prone 
cognitive process. Thus templates can reduce stress and improve coping skills. 
The goal of training should be to increase an individual's ability to continue the normal 
coping process when presented with unforeseen circumstances (Bachrach, 1987). The 
danger of training and templates is over-reliance. Every stress situation is unique and 
therefore no template will match perfectly. The individual must retain some conscious 
ability to check the template and adapt it to the specific situation. Training, therefore, 




It is important that an individual maintains the ability to process information and make 
decisions while under stress. An individual sense of control and competence over or 
within a stress situation is crucial. An out-of-control, over-stressed individual will 
tend to truncate the coping process and become indecisive, losing the ability to analyze 
and act. As the stress situation overcomes the individual's ability to cope, panic sets in. 
Panic establishes a barrier in the stress response model, as shown in figure 4, that 
prevents the decision process. A lack of action or continuation of an inappropriate 
ongoing action may lead to errors and accidents. 
1. Stress 












decisions 3.  Response 
chosen 
Figure 4: Panic disrupts the stress response process (From Potter & Perry, 1989)3 
From errors to accidents... 
Figure 5 illustrates the process which creates errors and can culminate in an accident. 
In this study, an accident will be defined as personnel injury, occupational illness, 
death, or material loss or damage (This definition is based upon the Navy's definition 
of a mishap. See OPNAVINST 5100.19C). Conversely, a near accident will be defined 
as an event which had the potential to cause personnel injury, occupational illness, 
death, or material loss or damage, but did not due to some corrective action. 
■< Adapted from Stress and work: A managerial perspective, by John M. Ivancevich and Michael T 
Matteson. Glenview, 111. 
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i  Near 
Accident 
Accident! 
Figure 5: Direct, contributing and compounding events lead to accidents 
(modified from Bea, 1996) 
There are three critical steps in the evolution of an error into an accident: a direct 
cause; contributing event(s) and condition(s); and compounding event(s) and 
condition(s). The direct cause is the action or lack of action which immediately 
precedes the error. An example of a direct cause could be falling asleep while driving 
an automobile. Contributing events and conditions set the stage, or plant the seeds, for 
future direct causes of errors. To continue the example, a contributing event which 
caused the driver to fall asleep was his all-night study session cramming for a final 
exam. Once the error has occurred, compounding events and conditions can either 
diffuse the error or exacerbate it. Again, continuing with the example, a compounding 
effect could be the noise created by raised lane markers which helped to wake the 
driver and prevent an accident. Conversely, we could imagine several conditions such 
as a narrow road or soft shoulder which could magnify the potential negative 
consequences of the error. The factors identified at the beginning of this section in 
figure 1 (equipment, procedures, organization, environment, individual, and 
interactions) are the sources of contributing and compounding events and conditions. 
It should be noted that near accidents can be learning experiences which help identify 
sources of error and eliminate contributing and compounding conditions. According 
to Gary Beyerstein (1995), the Safety Manager at SubSea International, safety studies 
estimate a million shortcuts precede every fatality. The fatality is the tip of the accident 
pyramid shown in figure 6. The base of the pyramid is comprised of the shortcuts, and 
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m between are escalating levels of near-accidents which could (but too often do not) 
serve as lessons learned. 
/   Death     \ 
/ 
/         Lost time         \ 
/           accidents            \ 
100 + 
/                Recordable 
/                  accidents 
/                         First Aid Cases 
1.000 + /                             Near-Miss Accidents 
/                                            Unsafe Acts 
Figure 6: Accident Pyramid (modified from McSween, 1995) 
Accident investigations typically focus on the tip of the accident pyramid and attempt 
to erect barriers to similar accidents, such as personal protection equipment or back- 
up alarms on construction vehicles. These barriers are intended to prevent the 
reoccurrence of the same or similar accidents. Accidents continue to occur, however, 
because the vast majority of the accident pyramid, like an iceberg, remains hidden and 
not addressed. Human behavior and modern systems are too complicated to predict all 
the possible interactions which comprise the pyramid's base (Perrow, 1984). Figure 7 
illustrates how unique combinations of contributing factors and events can interact 
with human error to defeat safety programs and result in accidents. The key to 
accident prevention is to reduce or mitigate the occurrence of human error by focusing 
on the contributing and compounding human factors that comprise the bulk of the 
accident pyramid.  ~ 
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Contributing Human Compounding Safety 
factors Error factors Measures 
Organization; Slips,     lapses,    . Organization; OSHA; 
Equipment; fumbles, Equipment; Safety ACCI- 
Procedures; mistakes. Procedures; programs; DENT! 
Environment. violations. Environment Barriers 
Figure 7: Evolution of accident showing synergistic effects of organizational 
influences, site conditions, human error and safety measures. 
Crisis Management 
Accidents often seem to occur unexpectedly. This is probably because people failed to 
recognize the clues, signs and symptoms of the developing crisis which cumulated in 
an accident. A crisis can be defined as a rapidly developing sequence of events in 
which the risks associated with the system rapidly increase to a hazardous state (Bea & 
Roberts, in press) The complex mix of system factors shown earlier in figure 1 can 
interact in unique and unpredictable ways to create dangerous situations. Figure 8 
shows how danger will build over time until either corrective action is taken or an 
accident results. The rapidity of the danger build-up will vary by each system. 
It is important to realize that even though the individual operator is most often 
responsible for committing errors that cause accidents, it is the same individual 
operator who can recognize a danger build-up and safely correct the situation. More 
often than not, individual operators successfully recognize potentially dangerous 
situations and successfully correct the situation before it escalates into an accident. 
The operator's ability to recognize potentially dangerous situations can be improved by 
warning devices into systems. Additionally, note in figure 8 that training can 
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dramatically improve the operator's ability to recognize building danger and safely 






















Figure 8: Crisis evolution, resolution, and the effect of training 
(modified from Bea & Roberts, in press) 
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3. HUMAN FACTORS IN DIVING 
Diving is a means to accomplish work in a normally inaccessible and potentially 
hazardous environment.  Divers perform a wide range of activities underwater, 
including inspections, maintenance, repair and con'struction.  While working 
underwater, divers are subjected to high levels of physical and psychological stress due 
to increased ambient pressures, cold, currents and the limitations of life support 
equipment. Human factors are significant in diving because the underwater work 
environment is harsh and alien, and because diver life support systems depend upon 
technology that is designed, operated and maintained by humans.  It must be 
emphasized that man works in the sea by virtue of technology, not biology. Divers 
depend upon equipment to perform specific tasks and to provide life support during 
every dive. Continued improvements in this diving equipment allow man to work 
deeper and longer. Remotely operated vehicles (ROV's), which are unmanned, allow 
performance of various tasks in almost all depths for extended periods. Many essential 
underwater tasks, however, can only be performed or are best performed by a man 
underwater. A diver is the most versatile underwater tool. He is also the most 
unpredictable. As man ventures into the sea to perform work underwater, equipment 
supports his life, but his own behavior may threaten his safety. 
Working versus Recreational Diving 
This study focuses on professional working divers; nevertheless, the information 
presented should benefit all divers.4 It is beneficial to draw a distinction between the 
professional and recreational diver. The recreational, or sport diver, dives as a hobby 
and is usually motivated by a desire to explore and witness. The working diver is a 
professional who dives to perform a specific task or service. Both divers are usually 
trained and certified, but recreational diving equipment is typically limited to SCUBA, 
Self Contained Underwater Breathing Apparatus. Working divers are trained to use a 
variety of diving systems, from SCUBA to deep diving, surface supplied, mixed gas 
systems. A recreational diver may use some ancillary equipment to enhance 
enjoyment, such as a light, camera or scooter. The working diver, on the other hand, 
will almost always use a tool to perform a specific task, such as a video camera for 
4
 Some of the referenced papers supporting this study focused on the recreational diver because of the 
lack of data available from the professional diving community (See Morgan, 1995). 
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inspections, electrodes for welding or explosives for demolition. Finally, since the goal 
of recreational diving is personal enjoyment, a decision to abort a dive, perhaps due to 
ill health or deteriorating weather, normally only affects the diver and his buddy. A 
working diver faced with the same decision, however, must disappoint a client who 
needs and expects the diver's services. Thus, it can be argued, the working diver often 
faces greater pressure to tip the scales balancing service and safety toward service. 
This study's evaluation of human factors associated with diving will hopefully help the 
diver and diving supervisor knowledgeably weigh the competing influences and make 
the best decision when balancing tradeoffs between service and safety. 
Factors in Diving 
A dive team performing work underwater can be considered a system that is 
influenced by the six factors shown earlier in figure 1: equipment, procedures, 
organization, environment, individuals, and interactions. There are unique diving 
related considerations associated with each of these factors. 
Equipment: 
Dive equipment can be grouped into four general categories: 
• Specialized diver tools (e.g., underwater welding equipment); 
• Equipment that helps man adapt to the underwater environment (e.g., fins help a 
diver move through the water, and a mask helps him see); 
• Safety and protective equipment (e.g., a knife to cut free of entanglements; suits to 
provide both thermal and abrasion protection); 
• Life support equipment (e.g., the tank and regulator system that provides breathing 
gas to the diver). 
According to Elliott (1984), "If man is to work safely at the deeper depths, it is further 
development of equipment in support of the diver that will be particularly important." 
Diving equipment manufacturers are continuously improving equipment to allow man 
to dive deeper, longer and safer. All equipment, nonetheless, still has limitations and 
exerts significant stress on a diver. Tools are often bulky and physically difficult to 
move and operate underwater. Protective suits can restrict mobility. Fins work 
muscles differently than walking or running. Regulators require increased breathing 
effort. 
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The diver must be able to function within the given limitations of today's equipment. 
Proper equipment engineering can decrease the physical demands placed upon the 
diver. It is also crucial that equipment design consider psychological demands. 
Research by Morgan (1983b) postulated that "anxiety states may be a response to 
disordered breathing" caused by use of respirators qr SCUBA. Morgan, Lanphier, 
Raglin and O'Connor (1989) went on to show that'"some individuals who perform 
physical exercise while wearing SCUBA sometimes experience respiratory distress 
and/or panic behavior." Morgan (1983a) argued that while most research and 
development of SCUBA focuses on the respirator component of the person-respirator 
interface, more attention needs to be paid to the psychological components. 
Procedures 
Dive procedures are promulgated in many forms, including the Navy Dive Manual, 
PADI Dive Manual, OSHA Sub-Part T, Codes of Federal Regulations, specific rules and 
regulations for individual diving companies, and so on. Separate dive procedures are 
developed for each type of diving, such as air and mixed gas diving, inshore and 
offshore diving, or recreational and professional diving. Dive tables that prescribe 
depth and time limitations are also a subset of procedures which reflect the unique 
nature of the diver's hyperbaric work environment. 
Environment 
The underwater work environment exposes divers to physical, psychological and 
pathological stresses. No other industrial working environment alters normal worker 
physiology more than diving (Vorosmarti, 1987). Environmental effects include 
pressure, cold, currents, and limited visibility. Moreover, underwater conditions can 
change rapidly without warning. The author has experienced dives offshore where 
unexpected currents arose during the dive, sweeping divers from the intended dive 
site. Divers must anticipate environmental conditions and effects, and plan 
accordingly. It is important to recognize that the diving environment cannot be 
controlled, but the diver can control when and how he enters into the environment. 
Individual 
The dominant factor controlling diver safety is the individual diver's physical and 
mental fitness to dive. Considerable research has focused on the physiology of diving, 
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but little research has been done on the psychology of diving. Detailed lists of physical 
contraindications to diving have been published3, and it is well established that diving 
is a physically demanding job. Some diving tasks require considerable strength and 
stamina, as well as a reserve of physical and psychological strength sufficient to cope 
with unexpected situations (Mebane & Mclver, unknown). According to Shelanski 
(1996), however, mental fitness may be at least as important as physical fitness for 
divers. Indeed, behavioral problems may be more important than physical problems 
because 'no amount of physical screening can protect a diver from his own stupidity' 
(Vorosmarti, 1987). Furthermore, since 'the majority of diving accidents are caused by 
poor judgment or inattention to the basic rules of diving safety...' maturity and 
responsibility should be evaluated more carefully than physical conditions. 
(Vorosmarti, 198 7) Therefore, a diver, whether professional or recreational, should 
have some minimum capabilities in order to dive safely.  It is important to recognize 
that not everyone has the physical and mental capacity to dive safely.  Physical and 
psychological screening of potential new divers could improve dive safety. Physical 
screening standards which reflect anticipated work demands are commonly used by 
commercial and military divers. These standards can vary widely, but the need for 
physical screening is widely accepted. Psychological screening, conversely, is resisted 
in spite of the fact that research has successfully developed a unique psychological 
profile for divers. According to Morgan (1995), divers are "characterized by low 
scores for measures of anxiety, and high scores for measures of aggression, 
assertiveness, confidence and sensation-seeking; they also tend to possess an internal 
locus of control." Moreover, Morgan has successfully used the Spielberger's State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory to predict with 88% accuracy which divers amongst a class of new 
recreational divers would experience panic. Selection of individuals for diving and 
other high consequence operations should match the individual's mental and physical 
abilities to job demands (Flin & Slaven, 1995). 
Organization 
If the dominant controllable factor affecting diver safety is the individual diver, then 
the organizational factor is the dominant controllable factor affecting the individual 
J
 For example, see Vorosmarti, James Jr., MD, (Ed.) (1987), Fitness to Dive. Thirty- 
fourth Undersea and Hyperbaric Medical Society Workshop. Undersea and Hyperbaric 
Medical Society, Inc., Bethesda, MD. 
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diver's behavior. The organization can be viewed at many different levels starting with 
a two man buddy team and growing to include the dive team, overall organization and 
entire diving industiy.  It is important to recognize that all organizational levels exert 
influences on the individual diver's behavior and performance. 
Interactions '- 
This is the most unpredictable factor.  Unanticipated interactions between factors can 
be critical when a diver is working in an isolated hyperbaric environment. Thorough 
planning and preparation are necessary to minimize unanticipated interactions, and 
effective coping skills under stress are necessary to control interactions when they do 
arise. 
Panic 
The principle cause of diver injury or death is panic, or a loss of control (Morgan, 
1995; Elliott & Bennett, 1989; Bachrach, 1987)G. An analysis of the human factors 
associated with diving will define the primary influences which lead to panic, and 
suggest methods to promote safety. 
Dive safety is primarily controlled by the individual diver and his ability to cope with 
stress underwater (Bachrach, 1987). Figure 9 illustrates the evolution of a dive 
accident beginning with a diver in a normal psychological and physiological state. 
Applying a Stressor alters the diver's psychological and physiological state, and if the 
stress becomes excessive the diver's skills will diminish. As previously discussed, 
Stressors may come from human factors, organizational factors, the environment, 
equipment, procedures or interfaces between any of the above factors (recall figure 1). 
It should be noted that these stress effects are cumulative. For example, cold water is 
an environment Stressor that will reduce the diver's physical dexterity. Organizational 
pressure to extend bottom times and improve productivity can increase the cumulative 
stress level perceived by the diver, while use of a hot-water suit can reduce the stress 
level. 
B
 These studies focused on recreational diving statistics, but the author believes that the statement holds 
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Figure 9: Evolution of an dive accident (Modified from Bachrach) 
Normally a diver is able to cope with applied Stressors and perform the dive safely. As 
long as the diver has sufficient capacity for coping, then the stress is relieved or 
controlled and the operation can continue.  If the stress demand exceeds the diver's 
capacity, then the Stressor is beyond the diver's control and an accident may result 
(Bachrach, 1987). 
Coping 
Stress response, or coping, as shown earlier in figure 2, is a cognitive process which 
evaluates a stress situation and available options, then selects the best course of action 
to respond. It is important that a diver maintains the ability to process information and 
make decisions while under stress, especially when presented with unforeseen events, 
as shown in figure 6. The diver's maxim, "stop, breathe, think, act", is a proven method 
for working through unexpected events. 
Stop, Breathe, Think, then Act. This is the maxim for managing unexpected events 
underwater, and it is taught universally to commercial and recreational divers. The 
intent is to calm the diver and maintain an ability to cognitively appraise a stress 
situation. 
1. Stop any action which may have created or is exacerbating the stress situation. 
2. The diver should focus on breathing. Experience shows that the majority of dive 
fatalities are due to drowning even though ample air is still available to the diver. 
This step should calm the diver's rising anxiety by showing him that adequate life 
support is on hand. 
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3. The diver must think about the problem and evaluate the options for resolving the 
imposed stress. The diver is probably now operating in Reason's knowledge-based 
performance level where training and education can pay dividends. 
4. Last, select a preferred option and act. This completes the stress response process. 
It is important to realize that the dive maxim, "stop,'breath, think, act" is generally a 
good response, however, it is not a panacea for diving emergencies. The response 
assumes that both time and adequate air supply are available. Experience shows that 
this is usually true, but not always. Certain situations require immediate instinctive 
responses which must be ingrained via education, training and retraining. For 
example, a diver should instinctively exhale whenever ascending to prevent lung 
overpressurization injuries.  If a diver is subject to a collision or upwelling underwater, 
his natural reaction may be to tense up and hold his breath. This natural reaction 
could prove fatal if the diver is lifted sufficiently to cause lung overexpansion. Only 
through training, education and perhaps proper selection will the diver instinctively 
exhale. Other factors to prevent panic are listed in table 3. 
Physical fitness: having a reserve capacity 
Training which emphasizes in-water skills and comfort 
Medical exams to ensure no hidden contraindications to diving 
Fatigue prevention 
Age limits 
Table 3: Factors to prevent diver panic. (From Bachrach) 
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4. ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS IN DIVING 
While dive safety is foremost a function of the individual diver's performance, it is the 
diver's organization which exerts the dominant antf'controllable influences affecting 
the diver's performance. The organization often controls the multiple influences acting 
upon the diver, and organizational factors (such as culture, regulations, structure and 
supplies) are responsible for the majority of contributing and compounding events 
leading to accidents. It is important that the individual diver is part of a team which 
can help him cope with unforeseen circumstances. Methods are needed to help 
organizations exert positive, rather than detrimental, influence on the diver. Current 
organizational research into the characteristics of High Reliability Organizations, and 
the airline industry's Crew Resource Management can help improve organizational 
factors on two different levels. The former takes a macro-view of the organization, 
while the later focuses on team development within an organization. 
High Reliability Organizations 
Background 
Many modern organizations operate in hazardous and uncertain environments which 
have the potential not only to harm employees, but also cause catastrophic harm to the 
public and surrounding ecosystems. Examples of such organizations include a nuclear 
power plant or oil refinery. Modern technology has magnified man's ability to do 
work, but it has also magnified the potentially negative consequences of that work 
(Wenk, 1986). In organizations where the consequences of an accident can be 
catastrophic, accidents are intolerable. Consequently, errors that could potentially lead 
to an accident are unacceptable. Fortunately, many potentially hazardous 
organizations operate nearly error and accident free, and these organizations have 
been labeled as High Reliability Organizations (HRO's) (Roberts, 1990). 
Organizational researchers have defined high reliability organizations as 
"technologically complex, potentially hazardous organizations in which accidents can 
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be catastrophic to the organization and/or society as a whole, but operate nearly 
accident free" (Roberts, 1994). A good example is the U.S. air traffic control system, 
where controllers handled over seventy million aircraft flights during the 1980's 
without a single mid-air collision (Roberts, 1990). Other HRO's which have been 
studied in depth include Pacific Gas & Electric (PG#E), and the US Navy's aviation 
program. The product of this research is a list of organizational characteristics that 
promote reliability, and challenges to some common theories of organizational design. 
High reliability characteristics are useful for dive operations even though dive teams 
do not strictly meet the definition of a 'high reliability organization'.  While diving is 
certainly technologically complex and potentially hazardous, errors would rarely be 
considered catastrophic to the public or environment. Errors committed underwater, 
however, can lead to fatal consequences for the individual diver. Therefore, this study 
strives to improve dive safety by applying the results of research into high reliability 
organizations. 
High Risk Systems 
High reliability organizations must overcome two characteristics common to high risk 
systems: complex interactions and tight coupling (Perrow, 1984; Roberts, 1990a, 
1990b). According to Perrow, interactions between system components or procedures 
can be either linear or complex. "Linear interactions are those in expected and 
familiar production or maintenance sequence, and those that are quite visible even if 
unplanned. Complex interactions are those of unfamiliar sequences, or unplanned 
and unexpected sequences, and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible" 
(Perrow, 1984). While linear interactions dominate in a system, it is the complex 
interactions which often have the potential for catastrophic consequences. High 
reliability organizations, therefore, must somehow compensate for these complex 
interactions. 
Social scientists use the term 'coupling' to describe the strength of relationships within 
an organization. Loosely coupled systems have loose connections. Tightly coupled 
systems, on the other hand, are characterized by time dependent processes, invariant 
process sequences, invariant production goals, and little slack. Time-dependent 
processes cannot wait for attention. Invariant processes must be completed in an 
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expected sequence, e.g. B must follow A; and invariant production goals allow only one 
general production method.   Little slack does not allow for any variance from 
expectations (Perrow, 1984). In general, tight coupling implies a lack of flexibility 
within the system and its operating procedures.   HRO strategies work to control 
processes, but retain enough flexibility to adapt to unforeseen events. 
Characteristics of High Reliability Organizations 
Organizational researchers have developed a list of characteristics common to high 
reliability organizations. These characteristics help the organization overcome complex 
interactions and tight coupling common to high risk systems and allows the 
organization to reduce risk and promote reliability. These characteristics, which are 
listed in table 4, are also appropriate for organizations emphasizing safety. 
Focus on Reliability 
Adaptive organizational structure 
Accurate decision making 
Training 
Flexibility within formal rules 




Culture of reliability 
Table 4: Some characteristics of high reliability organizations 
(from Roberts & Libuser, 1993) 
FOCUS ON RELIABILITY: The dominant characteristic of every HRO is a long-term 
focus on reliability (Roberts, 1990a). Reliability pervades every aspect of the 
organization, including personnel, equipment and procedures. 
ADAPTIVE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE: The majority of HRO's studied are 
hierarchical structures, but rapidly shift to a decentralized structure when faced 
with a potential crisis. The formal hierarchy helps keep the organization stay on 
track during normal operations, while the decentralization adaptation helps 
improve and expedite decision making in stress situations. 
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ACCURATE DECISION MAKING: Operational reliability is a direct result of 
accurate decisions, both under normal and stressful conditions (Roberts, Stout, 
Halpern, 1994).  If an organization needs to make accurate decisions, then the 
decision must be allowed to migrate within the organization to the most qualified 
decision maker for the given situation. Moreover, these decisions must often be 
expeditious since the complex interactions and tight coupling of high tech systems 
can cause errors to rapidly escalate into accidents (Roberts, Stout, & Halpern, 
1994). When rapid decisions are required in high reliability organizations, the 
decision is most likely to be made at the point of problem sensing, normally at the 
operator's level (Roberts, 1994). Normal daily operating decisions are also made at 
the operator's level; while strategic decisions are pushed up to higher managerial 
or executive levels. Decisions may also migrate laterally to the most experienced 
individual in the organization, if he is the most qualified to decide.  Good decisions 
depend upon open, efficient, and effective communications, so information must 
freely migrate throughout the organization. 
TRAINING: HRO's are constantly conducting training (Roberts. 1994). Training 
helps improve decision making skills and is an effective means of coping with 
system complexity. An organization can use training to improve daily performance 
and to prepare for crisis response. Training must focus on areas where errors may 
occur and promote the development of recognition and coping skills in the 
operators, who must recognize and correct errors before they develop into 
accidents. The earlier an error is identified and corrective action initiated, the 
easier it is to control. Training improves an individual's ability to perform under 
stress ( recall figure 3) and his ability to recognize and control rapidly developing 
crisis. 
FLEXIBILITY WITHIN FORMAL RULES: Research shows that formal rales help 
mitigate risk, if they are followed and enforced (Roberts, 1993). Rules keep the 
organization on track during normal operations.  When faced with a unique and 
unanticipated crisis, however, formal rules often do not apply and can lead to 
disaster if followed too rigidly.  Under such circumstances the organization must be 
flexible and reactive (Roberts, 1994). 
USER-FRIENDLY HUMAN-SYSTEM INTERFACES: Human Factors Engineering and 
ergonomics are important. Engineers tend to believe that the world is uninhabited, 
and design equipment accordingly (Wenk, 1996). This is a grave error, however, 
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since the majority of accidents occur during system operations and are caused by 
people. Equipment and procedures should recognize human limitations, and the 
extent of automation should reflect the needs of the operator. 
PROCESS AUDITING: HRO's use internal and external auditing of their processes to 
identify sources of problems and ensure rules a«e followed. Audits provide a 
system of checks which keeps the process on target, and promote early detection of 
errors. Independent checking is especially valuable because it brings untainted 
views. Thus, the adverse effects of errors are detected and corrected before they 
escalate into an accident. 
REDUNDANCY: Redundancy in people, equipment, and procedures strengthens 
the organization so that it can survive minor errors. The organization cannot 
afford to act like a chain, which is only as strong as the weakest link. Within an 
organization, redundancy can be achieved in two ways: through duplication and 
overlap. Duplication provides two or more units performing the same tasks, such as 
back-up pumps. Overlap implies that neighbors can cover for neighbors, or each 
man knows the job of the man directly above and below. If a person is lost, 
someone can step in without a significant loss to the organization. Additionally, 
redundant monitoring increases the likelihood that an error is detected early and 
corrective action is taken quickly before it escalates into a larger problem (Roberts, 
1994). 
SENIOR MANAGEMENT: Senior management in HRO's look at the big picture, and 
plan strategically. They act as information and resource distributors, helping 
various parts of the organization obtain the information and resources they 
require. 
CULTURE OF RELIABILITY: Culture can be defined as the shared norms and values 
of a group, or simply as "the way we do things here" (Helmreich, 1996). Once in 
place, it is difficult to change the organization's culture, but change may occur 
through a continuous and gradual process. Organizational culture pervades all 
other high reliability characteristics, and it is the lynch pin which holds the 
organization together. The organizational culture establishes behavioral norms by 
rewarding desired behavior and punishing inappropriate behavior. Rewards and 
punishment are the links between authority, responsibility and accountability 
within the organization. If an individual is given a responsibility, then he must 
also be given commensurate authority within the organization to fulfill his 
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responsibility. Finally, the individual is held accountable through rewards or 
punishment.  In HRO's, reliability is rewarded. 
Combating High Risk 
The combined effects of HRO characteristics help th^e organization combat high risk by 
diffusing complexity and tight coupling. Complex'interactions are managed through 
user-friendly interfaces, training, redundancy and accurate decision making. User- 
friendly human-system interfaces minimize system complexity. Training helps prepare 
operators to cope with unexpected events, and improves their decision making. 
Redundancy ensures there is more than one means to respond to unexpected events, 
and accurate decision making ensures the response is appropriate. Tight coupling is 
managed by allowing flexibility within the organization's structure and formal rales. 
Front-line personnel are given the authority to react as necessary, and the 
organizational culture holds them accountable for their actions.  Reliability is 
promoted by rewarding reliable behavior. Senior management and continuous process 
auditing monitor the system and ensure it maintains its focus on reliability. 
Crew Resource Management 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) is a training methodology which promotes team 
reliability through development of interpersonal skills. Originally developed for the 
airline industry, CRM is ideal for any environment where people must interact with 
technology and each other. It has recently been successfully exported to military 
aviation, hospital operating rooms, nuclear power plants and corporate management. 
This study proposes that CRM principles be applied to working dive teams. 
The necessity of CRM is illustrated by two points. First, the successful operation of 
complex, high tech systems usually requires a cohesive team. Second, both the human 
and machine elements of that system have performance limits. Optimal performance 
is achieved when both people and equipment operate within their limits. Performance 
degrades when people or equipment operate outside of these limits (Merritt & 
Helmreich, in press). Engineers have long recognized equipment limitations. 
Organizations, however, are only beginning to recognize the limits of the human 
elements. This recognition of human factors is crucial according to Helmreich because 
"research into accidents and adverse incidents has shown that the majority involve 
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human error. Perhaps more significantly, the errors by humans tend to fall in the 
areas of team coordination and communication, leadership, and decision making." 
Thus, exceeding performance limits causes breakdowns within the team, which leads 
to system accidents. 
The goal of CRM is to reduce the frequency and mitigate the consequences of human 
errors (Helmreich & Merritt, 1996). Figure 10 portrays the CRM goal as a 
multilayered pyramid. The entire pyramid represents all the errors which a team may 
commit. CRM strives to prevent the majority of these errors, represented by the bottom 
layer of the pyramid. Since human error can never be completely eliminated, CRM 
also strives to contain the effects of errors which do occur, and these errors are 
represented as the pyramid's middle layer. Containment prevents the rapid escalation 
of an error into an accident. Finally, if accidents do occur, CRM principles help to 
mitigate the consequences. This is represented by the tip of the pyramid. It is 
important to recall figure 4 which showed that the one accident represented by the tip 
of the pyramid is typically preceded by one-million unsafe acts at the base of the 
accident pyramid. If we can learn from these unsafe acts and near accidents, then 







Figure 10: The error troika of CRM (from Helmreich & Merritt, 1996) 
CRM strives to reduce human error by understanding the relationship between human 
performance and stress. It is imperative that the organization recognize the 
inevitability of human error, and the relationship between error and stress. Stress 
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should be recognized as a component of all human effort, and not as an individual 
weakness. An individual's willingness to acknowledge the effects of stress on his or her 
performance is subject to influence from the national, organizational and professional 
cultures. Organizations which must operate accident free must encourage its members 
to admit infallibility and acknowledge the effects ofvstress. The organization should 
adopt non-punitive policies regarding eveiyday error. This does not suggest that 
organizations accept the consequences or become tolerant of violations (Helmreich and 
Merritt, 1996). 
Training was discussed earlier as a means to improve individual performance under 
any given stress level. This develops individual competency. CRM demands that 
individuals first be competent in their individual skill requirements, before they begin 
team training. Team training is also necessary to develop coordination through 
interpersonal skills. CRM focuses on team training aspects, and the development of 
effective interpersonal skills which promote safe team operation. The positive results 
experienced in commercial aviation and within NASA clearly validate "the operational 
usefulness of human factors training as a means of improving crew and organizational 
effectiveness" (Helmreich, 1996b). The elements of CRM are correlated with requisite 
knowledge, skills and behaviors in Table 5. 
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«   --■   ""   •"              ........ ... Captain's authority emergencies command timely decisions 
management supervision balance 
use of authority direction management appropriate 
responsibilities coordination operational 
leadership leadership provide direction 
decision making V solicit information Crew climate synergy respect   '- admit mistakes 
stress management confidence interactions 
behavior styles briefings inform before act 
team building communications request input 
diversity listening 
describe Crew development learning process encourage 
thinking explanation feedback 
association feedback professional 
competence discussion reinforcement 
instruction demonstration 
professional 
use of simulation 
Communication listening communications sharing 
verbal communication questions objectives defined 
non-verbal communication non-defensive decisions defined 
barriers to communication listen ask questions 
impact of systems verity clear statements 
Problem definition information obstacles recognition state when wrong 
biases assess information discuss significance 
strategics recognize wrong considerations 
conditions recognize bias scan & monitor 
formulate conclusions question 
:  request information Decision making tools A methods use resources 
individual k group resolve differences question information 
inquiry * critique communicate discuss information 
advocacy use inquiry state decisions 
responsibility resolve conflict advocate ;  state analyses 
anticipating solutions :  focus on what is right 
conflict resolution 
Workload sequence demands communications 
regulation of information flow- clarity assignments 
management task prioritization planning acknowledge 
task assignment recognition of indicators briefings 
planning A preparation take initiative :  expressions 
:  plan for expected 
Situation awareness operational conditions monitoring observing 
environmental conditions projecting monitoring 
distractions assessment communications 
preoccupation recognition avoid distractions 
irregularities select information 
emergencies ask questions 
stress continually assess 
fatigue 
" where you are 
* where you have been 
* where vou are going 
ask crew ask passengers Resource use internal resources use of crew 
external resources use of passengers ask external sources 
factors affecting use of information systems search manuals 
* time use of manuals search data 
* risk use of data 
* safety 
* availability 
Table 5:  Crew Resource Management (from Bea & Roberts, in press) 
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5. IMPLEMENTATION 
Improving Dive Safety 
Efforts to improve dive safety can take many forms^uch as incremental improvements 
in dive equipment, continued training, or improved depth-time algorithms This paper 
has argued that the most significant improvement in dive safety can be gained by 
focusing on human factors and eliminating sources of human error within diving. 
This assertion is affirmed through expert opinion and dive accident data. If this 
premise is accepted, then a set of practical tools is necessary to implement human 
factors awareness in daily dive operations. Such human factor tools must decrease the 
probability of human error and the effects of errors that do occur. This can be 
accomplished by managing the contributing and compounding conditions associated 
with system factors: environment, equipment, procedures, organization, individuals 
and interactions. 
• Environment. The underwater environment exerts significant physical and 
psychological stress that is beyond the diver's control. Divers, therefore, must 
identify the unique environmental conditions (depth, temperature, etc.) and 
potential hazards (dangerous marine life, strong currents, etc.) and plan the dive 
accordingly. The plan must include contingency responses for low probability, but 
high consequence accidents. Thus a thorough dive plan can mitigate environment 
Stressors. The dive plan must also address equipment and procedural factors, as 
well as individual and organizational factors. 
• Equipment. Dive equipment, especially life support equipment, also exerts 
significant stress on the diver. Research and development must continue to 
improve equipment ergonomics and physiological support. Also, new equipment 
designs should emphasize robustness and simplicity in design and operation. In the 
field, equipment considerations are focused on selection, maintenance and usage. 
Selecting the right tool for the job at hand is crucial for diver's working remotely in 
an alien environment. Maintenance is also crucial, especially with life support 
equipment, to ensure the equipment functions as planned when needed. Finally, 
the diver must be trained to use the equipment properly. These critical equipment 
decisions reflect procedural, individual and organizational factors. 
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• Procedures. Diving rules and regulation allow an inherently hazardous operation 
to be performed safely. Rules, however, are only valuable if they are understood 
and abided by. The organizational culture often determines whether rules are 
followed or violated. 
• Organization. Divers almost always function af-members of teams, and the team's 
organizational culture exerts significant influences on individual behavior and 
performance. Dive planning was discussed earlier as a means to identify potential 
hazards and mitigate risks, but the dive plan is only effective if it is implemented 
successfully. The old adage holds true: plan your dive and dive your plan. The 
culture of the team will determine the thoroughness of the plan and the 
effectiveness of its implementation. The desired characteristics of High Reliability 
Organizations and the techniques of Crew Resource Management can help ensure 
that the organizational culture emphasizes safety. 
• Individual. In field operations, all the previous factors are manifested in the 
actions of the individual operator. Therefore, the individual is the primaiy focus of 
human factors efforts to improve dive safety. 
• Interactions. Interactions are often unforeseen, and are best combated by 
developing simple, yet robust systems and procedures with loose correlations and 
redundancy. Also, individual divers must maintain a reserve of physical and 
emotional strength that will allow them to cope with unexpected interactions. 
Human considerations should be incorporated into all of the above factors. Two 
factors, however, demand special emphasis because they are the most controllable 
factors, yet are often the factors that are most out of control. Human factors in diving 
should focus on two controllable areas: first, improving individual awareness of 
human factors and ability to cope with stress, and second, improving team 
coordination, reliability and culture. 
Improving individual performance under stress 
Individual performance under stress situations can be improved by incorporating 
human factors into initial selection, qualification and follow-up training. Initial diver 
training should include human factors awareness. Divers must learn their limitations. 
There is more to this than teaching depth and time limitations. This includes teaching 
new divers that each individual has unique limitations. Divers must be aware of their 
own physical and psychological abilities to cope with applied Stressors, and recognize 
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when their performance begins to degrade due to excessive stress.  Initial training 
must also teach new divers how to cope with stress in the working environment. This 
is typically initiated in the controlled underwater environment of a pool, and then 
transitions to actual open water conditions. The controlled environment allows 
instructors to simulate high stress conditions without excessive risk. This high stress 
training is a common component of military dive training and most commercial 
training, but not recreational training. The high stress training is important because it 
teaches the individual diver how to cope with stress.  When the in-water training 
transitions to open-water conditions, the instructor typically does not impose high 
stress on the new diver. Instead, the environmental conditions add new stress to the 
diver, teaching him new coping skills. 
Coping skills, like any other skill, must be maintained through continuous training and 
experience. Typically, real-world experience helps the diver develop response 
templates to stress situations and additional high stress training is not required. 
Whenever a new dive environment or piece of dive equipment is introduced, however, 
work-up training should be done to acclimate the diver and allow for the development 
of response templates. 
Implementing Human Factors into Dive Teams 
Dive teams should strive to reflect the characteristics of High Reliability Organizations 
described in chapter 4, and possess a pervasive focus on safety. Crew Resource 
Management techniques can help develop these desired organizational characteristics 
in a team. The aviation and space research center at the University of Texas suggests a 
four phase approach to CRM implementation (Helmreich, in press, 1996b) that can be 
adapted to successfully implement human factors into dive teams. 
1. Diagnose the organization and define areas of concern regarding human factors. 
2. Develop a performance based human factors training program tailored to reflect 
the organization's specific needs, culture and personnel attitudes. 
3. Evaluate and validate the effects of the training through participant feedback and 
empirical follow-up analysis of the team's performance. 
4. Continue training and reinforcement of desired behaviors. 
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Diagnose the organization 
Diagnosing an organization is analogous to a medical diagnosis developed during an 
annual physical examination (Hee, Leverich & Mathur, 1996). The medical 
examination is conducted in four stages. The first stage is identifying the person to be 
examined. The second stage is evaluating the patient's health using information 
obtained through an extensive medical history questionnaire, a listing of the patient's 
complaints, and a preliminary examination conducted by nurses to obtain the patient's 
temperature, blood pressure, and other vital signs. During the third stage, the doctor 
evaluates all the information and identifies specific areas of concern. This third stage 
is conducted before the doctor ever examines the patient. The fourth stage occurs 
when the doctor physically evaluates the patient in the examination room. 
During the examination, the doctor focuses on areas of concern identified earlier. The 
doctor asks the patient questions about items written in the medical history 
questionnaire, and about complaints, examining those areas more closely. The doctor 
then makes an initial diagnosis, but also orders additional tests to confirm his 
diagnosis. The doctor may prescribe medication, if necessary, while awaiting the test 
results to confirm his initial diagnosis. 
In this medical example, the interaction between the doctor and the patient is crucial 
for proper correct diagnosis and treatment. The doctor has the medical knowledge to 
make a diagnosis based on the information provided; however, only the patient knows 
his body and he must articulate what ails him. Incomplete or incorrect information 
can lead to a misdiagnosis. Therefore, it is crucial that accurate information is 
obtained from the patient (the true expert regarding his body) on how his own body 
feels. It is important to note that the doctor works with a range of subjective values 
instead of an exact number when evaluating a patient. The doctor looks for trends in 
these values to determine if a condition is improving or deteriorating. 
The medical examination analogy can be translated into a methodology for diagnosing 
an organization, with three notable exceptions (Helmreich, 1996b): 
•    The organizational diagnosis should be team based rather than individual. This 
emphasizes that safety and operational effectiveness are team responsibilities. 
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• The diagnosis should include observations of real operations since statistically the 
majority of accidents occur during operations, and team member behavior is often 
inconsistent between training and real operations. 
• The diagnosis should focus on behaviors implicated in accidents rather than on 
technical proficiency. The intent of the diagnosis is to identify the presence of 
behavior that is known to be a contributing or compounding factor in accidents. It 
is this behavior which leads to degraded performance and technical errors. Thus, 
the diagnosis focuses on the root causes of accidents. It should be noted that 
similar behavior-based safety programs have been used successfully in such high 
risk companies as DuPont to achieve impressive breakthroughs in safety (McSween, 
1995). 
Diagnosing a dive team starts by identifying the organization and selecting expert 
evaluators. Just as a doctor is a recognized expert in physiology, the evaluators used to 
diagnose a dive team must be expert divers. Next, detailed information about the team 
is gathered. Administrative records listed in table 6 should be reviewed, and the 
material condition of critical equipment should be inspected. Records from any 
significant events, either positive or negative, should be reviewed. Information should 
also be gathered by interviewing team members regarding safety during team 
operations. From this information, areas of concern regarding the team's operations 
can be identified. The final step in the initial diagnosis is to observe field operations, 
focusing on previously identified areas of concern and behaviors implicated in 
accidents. 
Manuals Training Certifications 
Instructions Maintenance Medical records 
Publications Personnel Prior inspection results 
Operating logs 
Table 6: Administrative records and materials for review (from Commander, 1995) 
CRM has enjoyed notable success improving aviation safety by focusing on observable 
behavior during operations. CRM's expert observers record targeted behaviors that are 
known to precede errors and accidents on a checklist (called the Line/LOS Version 4). 
Checklist data and comments are later used to critique crew performance. Differences 
38 
between desired performance and observed performance can define learning objectives 
for performance based training.  In order to capitalize on the CRM's success, the CRM 
checklist has been adapted for dive teams. The resultant diving human factors 
checklist focuses on observable behavior which data and experience have shown 
precedes dive accidents. The checklist should prove,, useful in the initial diagnosis of a 
dive team's human factors awareness and abilities, and in accident investigations to 
help identify the compounding and contributing behaviors which lead to the accident. 
The checklist and instructions for its use are provided as appendix A. 
Training program development 
Human factors training starts with awareness and acceptance of stress as it impacts 
performance. Specific behavioral techniques which can help reduce the likelihood of 
an error are taught to counter the influence of stress and reduce error (Helmreich, 
1996). These techniques are listed in Table 7.  Once individuals understand the 
relationship between stress and performance, CRM transitions to team training in a 
simulated operational environment and focuses on development of effective 
interpersonal skills. Team training should be tailored to the specific organization and 
focus on areas of concern identified during the initial diagnosis of the team. 
Cross-checking Verification of communication 
Preparation Speaking up to express concerns 
Planning Snaring a mental model of the situation 
Vigilance 
Table 7: Individual behavioral techniques to reduce error (from Helmreich, 1996) 
Evaluate training 
Immediately following the training, the relevance and impact of the training should be 
measured through participant feedback. These feedback should be used as lessons 
learned to improve the training. Follow-up analysis of team performance should be 
done to identify trends in the teams performance. 
Reinforcing human factors skills 
Human factors skills are primarily interpersonal skills which allow individuals to work 
effectively as team members. Just like any physical skill, interpersonal skills must be 
practiced and continually reinforced to remain most effective. VonDerLinn (1995) has 
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identified the top three barriers to successful training that the organization should 
address in order to reinforce training objectives: 
1. Lack of reinforcement on the job; 
2. Interference from the immediate work environment; 
3. Non-supportive organizational culture. >( 
VonDerLinn also recommends the following measures to overcome training barriers: 
1. The organization must reward safety and reliability over production, 
schedule, or cost. 
2. Company policy must be rewritten to reflect new attitudes. 
3. All levels of the organization must support training goals. 
Accident Investigations 
The Human Factors in Diving Checklist (Appendix A) was developed primarily to 
record behaviors during real time observations of dive operations. The checklist, 
however, can also be useful during post accident investigations to record targeted 
behaviors. The checklist was so employed to evaluate a U.S. Navy dive accident that 
resulted in a diver fatality attributed in part to human error. The checklist was used to 
review a first-hand account of the accident and identify targeted behaviors. The 
results show where human factors acted as contributing and compounding events that 
lead to errors and eventually a fatal accident. The following sections summarize the 
first-hand account of the 1974 fatality. Contributing and compounding events are 
identified, and then correlated to the Human Factors in Diving Checklist. The resultant 
scores from the checklist are provided and evaluated. Finally, conclusions regarding 
the checklists usefulness as a post-accident investigation tool are offered. 
Background 
On 11 June 1974, a U.S. Navy Seabee diver attached to Underwater Construction Team 
One died in a diving accident. The direct cause of death is officially Arterial Gas 
Embolism, however; numerous contributing events preceded this direct cause. 
Additionally, after the diver surfaced and before the time of death, several 
compounding factors exacerbated the situation. A statement from the diver's buddy 
was reviewed to identify potential contributing and compounding factors which are 
listed below. This is by no means an exhaustive list of potential factors, nor is it 
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intended to place any blame on individuals or commands involved. The list is 
compiled in an effort to identify those human factors which actually did occur in a 
real-life tragedy, and to use this information to critique the effectiveness of the Dive 
Team Human Factors Checklist. The statement from the diver's buddy is included in 
this appendix. v 
SCENARIO 
A Navy dive team was attempting to stabilize an underwater cable by installing spit 
pipe around the cable in approximately 100 feet of water.  Weather was fair. Visibility 
good. Two divers were in the water using SCUBA. 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 
All factors listed in approximately chronological order and are negative unless 
otherwise noted: 
Pre-dive 
1. Diver was a smoker. 
2. Diver got a good nights sleep the previous evening. (Positive factor) 
3. Dive team felt pressured to complete work because support vessel was only 
available for a short time. 
4. The diver was relatively new to the team and was frequently teased. This 
behavior was probably normal for the group and applied to old as well as 
new members. However, teasing a new member may exert additional 
pressures on that member to prove his worth. 
5. Two relatively inexperienced divers paired as buddy team. 
6. Poor coordination of dive team put divers in the water before material (split 
pipe) was ready. As a result, the diver used air while waiting on the surface 
while the buddy did not use air. 
7. Initial dive brief was not clearly communicated or understood by both 
divers. More experienced buddy was given authority to change dive profile 
during dive, but did diver realize this? 
8. Effects of nitrogen narcosis unplanned for even though depth was expected 
to exceed 90 feet and diver had complained of previous narcosis at same 
depth. 
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9. The diver violated a well established SCUBA diving rule that requires all 
divers to end the dive and return to the surface before their tank pressure 
reaches 500 PSI. 
10. The diver had a tendency to deplete his air supply faster than most of the 
other divers. The dive plan, however, assumed that both divers could work 
up to the maximum time limits for the given depth. The plan did not 
account for the individual's limitations. 
11. Initial dive training did not emphasize rescue skills and the importance of 
exhalation during buddy breathing. 
12. Diver was slightly seasick prior to the dive. 
Dive 
1. Diver was using a borrowed regulator which was adjusted to breath 
especially easy. This is significant because the diver was already known as a 
heavy breather. 
2. Heavy tool bag dragged divers down and caused the buddy team to separate. 
3. Diver had difficulty equalizing on descent. This delayed the descent time. 
4. Buddies did not coordinate and communicate regarding change to dive 
profile. 
5. Underwater work was physically difficult. 
6. Diver may have experienced some nitrogen narcosis. 
7. The diver failed to routinely monitor his air supply, and depleted his air 
without warning. 
8. Both diver and buddy failed to abort dive when pressure gage indicated the 
bottle was empty. 
9. Buddy used inconsistent hand signals which may have created confusion. 
10. Buddy failed to intervene and force abortion of dive when gage read zero. 
11. Buddy failed to monitor situation and recognize diver's unsafe behavior. 
12. Dive team culture condoned breathing tank dry if necessary to complete a 
task. In short, the team rewarded production over safety. 
13. Buddy's failure to act early allowed the situation to develop into a crisis, and 
as a result the buddy had to ascend without his fins. This would limit his 
ability to help the diver during the ascent. 
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14. Diver never had formal training on Fenzy, a critical piece of dive equipment 
which could have saved his life. 
15. Diver showed evidence of panic during ascent when he grabbed buddy's 
regulator. 
16. Entanglement with mooring line during^scent probably caused diver to 
panic and make an uncontrolled rapid ascent from approximately 10 feet. 
DIRECT CAUSE OF DEATH: 
Arterial Gas Embolism probably the result of an uncontrolled rapid ascent 
accompanied by breath holding. 
COMPOUNDING FACTORS (Post dive): 
1. Chamber was readily available. (Positive factor) 
2. Transport to the chamber was fast and efficient (Positive factor) 
SCORE SUMMARY FROM DIVE TEAM HUMAN FACTORS 
CHECKLIST: 
Pre-Dive Dive Post-Dive 
• Team communications & coordination 2.0 N/A N/A 
• Situational awareness & decision making 1.8 2.0 2.0 
• Auditing N/A 1.0 N/A 
• Resources 2.7 2.7 2.5 
• Operational procedures 3.0 3.0 3.0 
• Training N/A 2.0 N/A 
• Individual fitness to dive 2.1 2.0 2.0 
• Special situations 2.0 2.0 3.0 
• Overall observation N/A N/A N/A 
Table 8: Accident investigation score summary 
EVALUATION 
The Dive Team Human Factors Checklist is intended to be used for observations of real- 
time operations and facilitate the recording of targeted behaviors. Its effectiveness as a 
post-accident analytical tool is limited by the fact that team behavior cannot be 
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observed, but instead must be conjectured from limited accounts of witnesses. Scores 
from a post-accident review will be negatively skewed as a result of the investigation's 
focus on what went wrong, and because of the limited information available. 
Obviously this lack of information is an obstacle that all accident investigations must 
overcome, so the checklist may offer some valuable»jnsight. In the post-accident 
context, the checklist can help correlate actual events to human factors that 
contributed to or compounded the situation. The scores from a post-accident review 
are not as important as this correlation to key behaviors. This correlation can help 
identify areas of concern regarding human factors within the team, and the scores may 
help focus attention on the most critical areas of concern. Thus the checklist can help 
sift through a variety of post-accident information, and should be useful in the 
development of post-accident lessons learned. 
The scores listed above indicate that the dive team only meet the minimal expectations 
in the majority of the evaluated areas. Two areas were below the minimum 
expectations:  (1) situational awareness and decision making during the pre-dive 
phase, and (2) auditing during the dive. Thus the checklist helped narrow the earlier 
lists of contributing and compounding factors down to the most critical areas. 
Moreover, in the author's opinion, the resultant focus on situational awareness, 
decision making and auditing truly does identify the most critical areas of concern. 
This information can now be used to develop "lessons learned" which focus of the most 
important elements of the accident. It is important to recognize, however, that all of 
the contributing and compounding factors played a role in the final outcome and 
therefore all factors should be addressed if resources permit. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Dive Team Human Factors Checklist proved to be a useful tool for post-accident 
investigations. It provided a structure for correlating a historical account of an 
accident to specific behaviors that are likely to have contributed toward or 
compounded the severity of the accident. This type of review provides valuable 
"lessons learned" that can help prevent future accidents. Further refinement of the 
checklist to increase its relevance to diving and the accuracy of its targeted behaviors 
should improve its usefulness. 
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6. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Dive accident data should be collected for the professional dive community as well 
as the recreational diving community. This data should track the presence of 
specific observable behaviors that are known tq'contribute to dive incidents and 
accidents. 
2. Accidents attributed to 'human error' should be further categorized according to 
observed behaviors which directly caused the accident (e.g., mistake, slip, violation, 
ignorance, communications, planning, selection, limitation, preparation, training, 
or impairment). 
3. Initial training for all divers should include formal classroom discussion of human 
factors. High stress situations should be simulated in a controlled environment to 
promote the development of coping skills underwater. 
4. Dive teams should be regularly assessed for human factors effectiveness. The draft 
Human Factors in Diving Checklist (appendix A) could be used as a tool to guide 
human factor evaluations of dive teams. 
5. Periodic training in human factors should be offered to reinforce human factors 
skills. 
Recommendation for further research 
The HF Checklist should be used to observe operational dives, and edited as necessary 
to improve focus on observable behavior that might contribute to dive accidents. 
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Appendix A 
DIVE TEAM HUMAN FACTORS CHECKLIST 
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DIVE TEAM HUMAN FACTORS CHECKLIST* 
Purpose: The purpose of this checklist is to (1) get an initial "temperature" of the dive 
team with respect to human factors, and (2) identify initial areas of concern which may 
warrant further examination. 




* Dive rig:  
* Air/gas supply:  
Dive scenario:  
* Task:  
* Depth:  
Temperature:  
* air:  
* water:  
Surface conditions:  
* swell:  
* current:  
* weather:  
Bottom conditions:  
Event data: 
* current:  
* bottom type:  
* temperature:  
'  visibility:  
Dive team members: 
* Dive supervise)!" ... 
* Diver #1:  
* Diver #2:  
* Standby diver:  
* Tenders for #1:  
* Tenders for #2:  
* Communications:.. 
* Charts:  
* MDV:  
* Diving Officer:  
This checklist was created bv adapting Helmreich's Lint LOS Version -4 aviation checklist for diving   (See Helmreich. Robert L.. Butler Rov t  Taggart William R   »Wilhelm 
lohn A (1993) The NASA University of Texas/ TAA Line, LOS Checklist: A behavioral marker-based checklist for CRM skills assessment." Aerospace Crew Research Project 
Technical Paper 94-02.) The checklist also models portions of the FIAIM II methodology for assessing human factors   (See Hee. Derrick (1996) Basic Minima] Questions for 
FLAIM II   Unpublished  Manne Teclinologv and Management Group. University of California. Berkeley 
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Evaluation criteria: 
Note: If performance is rated either poor (1) or outstanding (4), the observer should 
briefly explain the observed behavior in the "comments" section. 
Grade   Summary Description 
1 POOR Observed performance is significantly below expectation. 
This includes instances where necessary behavior was not 
present, and examples of inappropriate behavior that was 
detrimental to mission effectiveness. 
Minimum       Observed performance meets minimum requirements but 
Expectations there is ample room for improvement. This level of 
performance is less than desired for effective team 
operations. 
Standard The demonstrated behavior promotes and maintains team 
effectiveness. This is the level of performance that 
should be normally occurring in dive operations. 
Outstanding  Performance represents exceptional skill in the 
application of specific behaviors, and serves as a model 
for teamwork - truly noteworthy and effective. 
Evaluation: 
The following evaluation criteria focus on specific behaviors that serve as indicators of 
effective human factors management in diving. It is an attempt to gather targeted data 
in areas known to be direct, contributing or compounding causes of human error and 
accidents in diving. They are not intended to be an exhaustive list of behavior which 
should be seen, but rather as examples of effective behavior which provide a standard 
for comparison. 
Observers must be recognized diving experts with a superior level of knowledge, 
experience and training. This is crucial because only an expert will be able to 
recognize subtle but important differences in operations and behaviors. 
Observers are asked to focus on team effectiveness more than individual performance, 
except where evaluation criteria specifically target a specified team member. 
Occasionally, individuals may stand out from the others during team activities and the 
observer should record this exceptional behavior in the "comments". Not all behaviors 
will be seen during each dive phase, therefore it is acceptable to leave those sections of 
the checklist blank. 
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1. Team concept and environment for 
open Communications established 
and/or maintained, e.g., crew /' 
members listen with patience, do not 
interrupt or "talk over", do not rush 
through the briefings, make eye 
contact as appropriate. 
2. Briefings are operationally thorough, 
interesting, and address team 
coordination and planning for 
potential problems. Expectations are 
set for how possible deviations from 
normal operations are to be handled, 
e.g. tainted air source. 
3. Representatives from serviced ship or 
coordinating commands are included 
as part of team in briefings, as 
appropriate, and guidelines are 
established for coordination between 
commands. 
4. Group climate is appropriate to 
operational situation, e.g., presence 
of social conversation at appropriate 
times. Team ensures that non- 
operational factors, such as social 
interaction, do not interfere with 
necessary tasks. 
5. Team members ask questions 
regarding team actions and decisions, 
e.g., proposed method for task 
accomplishment. 
6. Team members speak up and state 
their information with appropriate 
persistence, until there is some clear 
resolution and decision, e.g., "I'm 
uncomfortable with...Let's ..." 
7. Each team member is assigned a 
clearly defined role. Each member 
understand and js qualified to 
perform assigned responsibilities. 
8. All team members participate fully in 
the dive operation; e.g., everyone 
pulls their own weight. 
9. Dive Supervisor effectively balances 
command authority and team 
member participation. The 
supervisor considers team 
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suggestions, but acts decisively when 
the situation requires. 
10. Operational decisions are clearly 
stated to and acknowledged by all 
team members, including 
coordinating commands when 
appropriate, e.g., "everyone is on the 
same page." 
1. Team members demonstrate high 
levels of vigilance (monitoring, 
scanning, cross-checking, auditing) 
in both high and low workload 
conditions, e.g., everyone is aware of 
work status and progress. 
2. Team prepares for unexpected or 
contingency situations including 
weather, tides, etc.; e.g., they "stay 
ahead of the curve". 
3. Team actions avoid creation of self- 
imposed workload, deadlines and 
stress, e.g., proper planning and 
situational awareness avoids diving 
in marginal or unsafe conditions. 
4. Dive is scheduled and effectively 
controlled to prevent excessive delays 
or time crunches; e.g., team members 
are not just standing around or 
forced to rush. 
5. Diver displays a high level of 
vigilance regarding his equipment, 
environment and task loading.  (Note: 
this is especially critical for SCUBA 
operations) 
6. Decisions are allowed to migrate 
within the team to the person most 
qualified to make the decision; e.g., is 
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1. Positive and negative performance 
feedback is given at appropriate 
times and is made a positive learning 
experience for the whole crew; /< 
feedback is specific, objective, based 
on observable behavior, and given 
constructively. 
2. Performance feedback is accepted 
objectively and non-defensively. 
3. Team members are aware of 
teammate performance levels, and 
intercede if performance is degraded 
or unsafe. 
4. Performance feedback from external 
auditors is accepted objectively and 
non-defensively. 
1. Operational tasks are prioritized to 
allow sufficient resources for dealing 
effectively with primaiy operational 
tasks before secondary tasks. 
2. Do individual team members believe 
that they have the right tools for the 
job at hand? 
3. Does the diver feel confident that the 
equipment is well maintained and in 
good working order? 
4. Support from external commands is 
meets dive team expectations; e.g., 
does the ship provide a hot lunch? 
1. Communications between diver and 
topside are in accordance with 
standard Navy procedures; e.g., 
commands are verified through 
repeat-backs. 
2. Dive manual procedures are 
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1. When appropriate, crew members 
take the initiative and time to share 
operational knowledge and 
experience, especially with new team 
members, revised operations or new 
equipment. 
2. Dive team members are rotated 
through dive team assignments. 
3. Team members are encouraged and 
given the opportunity to pursue 
additional qualifications; e.g., 
chamber operator or dive supervisor. 
4. Team members received adequate 
formal and/or on-the-job training in 
assigned equipment and 
responsibilities. 
5. Team members are cross-trained and 
qualified in multiple roles, e.g., 
console operator, tender, diver, etc. 
Diver was not trained in use 
of Fenzy. 
1. Team members recognize and report 
work overloads in self and others, 
e.g., stating "I'm getting overloaded 
down here", or "Can I get help or can 
you take over...?". 
2. Team culture recognizes human 
limitations and rewards admissions of 
fallibility or lack of fitness to dive, 
e.g., "I have some congestion and 
should not dive today" or "I'm 
distracted because of...and should not 
dive today". 
3. Diver is qualified, experienced and 
confident in use of dive rig and tools. 
4. Diver is qualified, experienced and 
confident in dive environment, e.g., 
dive may be in kelp, at night or in 
zero visibility. 
5. Diver's experience and training are 
current, e.g., when was last time the 
diver was in the water using this rig? 
6. Diver's ability, experience and 
training match specific job 
requirements. 
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7. Diver feels physically and mentally fit 
to dive; e.g. diver is not overly tired, 
nervous or boastful. 
8. Diver is not predisposed to DCS; e.g., 
smoker, overweight, over 40, 
dehydrated, fatigued, etc. 
9. Diver is able to evaluate options and 
cope with unexpected events. 
10. Dive plan accounts for individual 
diver strengths and weaknesses; e.g., 
diver may be a heavy breather and 
requires a shorter schedule. 
11. Buddy assignments reflect 
qualifications, experience and task 
requirements; e.g., inexperienced 
diver is paired with experience diver. 
12. Dive buddies communicate and 
cooperate effectively; e.g., the diver's 
get along and make an effective team. 
13. Team members recognize fatigue and 
take specific steps to help maintain 
team alertness, e.g., social 
conversation, physical activity, 
caffeine management. 
14. Team members recognize effects of 
exposure, either hypothermia or heat 
exhaustion, and take specific steps to 
help maintain individual health and 
alertness, e.g., warm or cold drinks as 
appropriate, crew rotations, etc. 
1. When conflicts arise, the team 
remains focused on the problem or 
situation at hand. Conflict issues are 
identified and resolved without 
losing focus on mission. 
2. Team members listen actively to ideas 
and opinions and admit mistakes 
when wrong 
3. Safety is consistently emphasized over 
production and deadlines. 
4. New team members are orientated 
and accepted as part of the team and 
not expected to "prove themselves". 
5. Incidents and accidents are recorded 
and reported as appropriate, and 
without fear of reprisal. 
6. Team is sheltered from unreasonable 
external expectations. 
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1. Overall technical proficiency 






B. EVALUATION OF DIVING FATALITY 
DIVE TEAM HUMAN FACTQRS CHECKLIST 
Purpose: The purpose of this checklist is to (1) get an initial "temperature" 
of the dive team with respect to human factors, and (2) identify initial areas 
of concern which may warrant further examination. 
Event data: 
Date (mo./yr.): 11 June 1974 
Reviewer: M.A. Blumenberg 
Command reviewed: UCT 1 
Equipment:  
* Dive rig: SCUBA 
* Air /gas supply: Air 
Dive scenario:  
* Task: Cable stabilization 
* Depth:   llOfsw 
Temperature:  
* air: unknown 
* water: unknown 
Surface conditions:^  
* swell: unknown 
* current: slight 
* weather: fair 
Bottom conditions:  
* cuiTent: none 
* bottom type: sand 
* temperature: comfox*table 
* visibility: 50-60 ft. 
Dive team members:  
* Dive supervisor: anonymous 
* Diver # 1: Ernest Bellavita (fatality) 
* Diver #2:  William McDevitt (buddy) 
* Standby diver: anonymous 
* Tenders for # 1: anonymous 
* Tenders for #2: anonymous 
* Communications: anonymous 
* Charts: anonymous 
* MDV: anonymous 
* Diving Officer: anonymous 
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1. Team concept and environment for 
open Communications established 
and/or maintained, e.g., crew 
members listen with patience, do not 
interrupt or "talk over", do not rush 
through the briefings, make eye 
contact as appropriate. 
2. Briefings are operationally thorough, 
interesting, and address team 
coordination and planning for 
potential problems. Expectations are 
set for how possible deviations from 
normal operations are to be handled, 
e.g. tainted air source. 
3. Representatives from serviced ship or 
coordinating commands are included 
as part of team in briefings, as 
appropriate, and guidelines are 
established for coordination between 
commands. 
4. Group climate is appropriate to 
operational situation, e.g., presence 
of social conversation at appropriate 
times. Team ensures that non- 
operational factors, such as social 
interaction, dp.not interfere with 
necessary tasks. 
5. Team members ask questions 
regarding team actions and decisions, 
e.g., proposed method for task 
accomplishment. 
6. Team members speak up and state 
their information with appropriate 
persistence, until there is some clear 
resolution and decision, e.g., "I'm 
uncomfortable with...Let's ..." 
7. Each team member is assigned a 
clearly defined role. Each member 
understand and is qualified to 
perform assigned responsibilities. 
Unknown 





8. All team members participate fully in 
the dive operation; e.g., everyone 
pulls their own weight. 
9. Dive Supervisor effectively balances 
command authority and team 
member participation. The 
supervisor considers team 
suggestions, but acts decisively (con't) 
Unknown 
when the situation requires. 
10. Operational decisions are clearly 
stated to and acknowledged bv all 
team members, including 
coordinating commands when 




1. Divers did not receive the 
same pre-dive instructions 
from the Diving Supervisor. 
2. Divers forced to hold on 
surface while waiting for 
split pipe which was not 
ready. 
1. Team members demonstrate high 
levels of vigilance (monitoring, 
scanning, cross-checking, auditing) 
in both high and low workload 
conditions, e.g., everyone is aware of 
work status and progress. 
2. Team prepares for unexpected or 
contingency situations including 
weather, tides, etc.; e.g., they "stay 
ahead of the curve". 
3. Team actions avoid creation of self- 
imposed workload, deadlines and 
stress, e.g., proper planning and 
situational awareness avoids diving 
in marginal or unsafe conditions. 
4. Dive is scheduled and effectively 
controlled to prevent excessive delays 
or time crunches; e.g., team members 
are not just standing around or 
forced to rush. 
5. Diver displays a high level of 
vigilance regarding his equipment, 
environment and task loading.  (Note: 
this is especially critical for SCUBA 
operations) 
6. Decisions are allowed to migrate 
within the team to the person most 
qualified to make the decision; e.g., is 
the diver's judgment trusted by 
topside? 
Pre: Corpsman was aware 
of diver's seasickness, but 
dive supervisor apparently 
was not. 
Dive: Buddy was aware of 
diver's problems. 
Pre: Planned for possible 
variations in depth; 
Post: Insufficient support 
for chamber operations. 
Pending loss of dive 
platform added pressure to 
get the work accomplished. 
Diver's forced to wait on 
surface until split-pipe was 
ready. Diver's should not 
have entered the water until 
all materials were ready. 
Diver's personal regulator 
was not functioning. 
Unknown 
Notes: 
          —« ——1»,»» --F 
1.   Positive and negative performance 
feedback is given at appropriate 
times and is made a positive learning 
experience for the whole crew; 
feedback is specific, objective, based 
on observable behavior, and given 
constructively. 




2.   Performance feedback is accepted 
objectively and non-defensively. 
Unknown 
3. Team members are aware of 
teammate performance levels, and 
intercede if performance is degraded 
or unsafe. 
4. Performance feedback from external 
auditors is accepted objectively and 
non-defensively. 
Notes: 
1.   Operational tasks are prioritized to 
allow sufficient resources for dealing 
effectively with primary operational 




Buddy recognized potential 
problems, but failed to act. 
N/A 
'"3     ~"  J *   »••-'•»■■-'' 
2.   Do individual team members believe 
that they have the right tools for the 
job at hand? 
3 3 2          Insufficient resources for 
chamber operation. 
3. Does the diver feel confident that the 
equipment is well maintained and in 
good working order? 
4. Support from external commands is 
meets dive team, expectations; e.g., 
does the ship provide a hot lunch? 
Notes: 
2 2 (1) Diver borrowed 
regulator since his was not 
is g,ood order. 




1. Communications between diver and 
topside are in accordance with 
standard Navy procedures; e.g., 
commands are verified through 
repeat-backs. 
2. Dive manual procedures are 




;.-f ,.!.■■ "• ■.; 
N/A for SCUBA operations 





When appropriate, crew members 
take the initiative and time to share 
operational knowledge and 
experience, especially with new team 
members, revised operations or new 
equipment. 
Dive team members are rotated 
through dive team assignments. 
Team members are encouraged and 
given the opportunity to pursue 
additional qualifications; e.g., 
chamber operator or dive supervisor. 
Team members received adequate 
formal and/or on-the-job training in 
assigned equipment and 
responsibilities. 
Team members are cross-trained and 
qualified in multiple roles, e.g., 















Team members recognize and report 
work overloads in self and others, 
e.g., stating "I'm getting overloaded 
down here", or "Can I get help or can 
you take over...?". 
Team culture recognizes human 
limitations and rewards admissions of 
fallibility or lack of fitness to dive, 
e.g., "I have some congestion and 
should not dive today" or "I'm 
distracted because of...and should not 
dive today". 
Diver is qualified, experienced and 
confident in use of dive rig and tools. 
Diver is qualified, experienced and 
confident in dive environment, e.g., 
dive may be in kelp, at night or in 
zero visibility. 
Diver's experience and training are 
current, e.g., when was last time the 
diver was in the water using this rig? 
Diver's ability, experience and 
training match specific job 
requirements. 
Diver feels physically and mentally fit 
to dive; e.g. diver is not overly tired, 
nervous or boastful. 
Diver is not predisposed to DCS; e.g., 
smoker, overweight, over 40, 
dehydrated, fatigued, etc. 
Diver is able to evaluate options and 
cope with unexpected events. 
10. Dive plan accounts for individual 
diver sti'engths and weaknesses; e.g., 
diver may be a heavy breather and 
requires a shorter schedule. 
11. Buddy assignments reflect 
qualifications, experience and task 
requirements; e.g., inexperienced 
diver is paired with experience diver. 
12. Dive buddies communicate and 
cooperate effectively; e.g., the diver's 
get along and make an effective team. 
Diver handed off heavy tool 
bag to buddy. 
Team culture criticized diver 
for being a heavy breather 
instead of recognizing that 
everyone has a unique air 
demand. 
Diver was not formally 
trained on Fenzy. 
Diver has limited experience 
diving over 100 fsw, and his 
confidence may have been 
low. 
Diver felt slightly seasick 
before dive. 
Diver was a smoker. 
Diver did not respond 
appropriately to early signs 
of pending accident. 
(1) Dive supervisor did not 
account for diver's record of 
heavy breathing. 
(2) Dive team failed to 
abort dive plan when air 
supply l'an low. 
Both divers has limited 
experience. 
61 
13. Team members recognize fatigue and    3 Diver slept well the previous 
take specific steps to help maintain night. 
team alertness, e.g., social  (con't) 
conversation, physical activity, 
caffeine management. 
14. Team members recognize effects of N/A 
exposure, either hypothermia or heat               /' 
exhaustion, and take specific steps to 
help maintain individual health and 
alertness, e.g., warm or cold drinks as 





When conflicts arise, the team 
remains focused on the problem or 
situation at hand. Conflict issues are 
identified and resolved without 
losing focus on mission. 
Team members listen actively to ideas 
and opinions and admit mistakes 
when wrong 
Safety is consistently emphasized over    2 
production and deadlines. 
The team reacted efficiently 
to the dive accident. 
Unknown 
New team members are orientated 
and accepted as part of the team and 
not expected to "prove themselves". 
Incidents and accidents are recorded 
and reported as appropriate, and 
without fear of reprisal. 
Team is sheltered from unreasonable     2 
external expectations. 
Diver was more concerned 
about getting the job done 
than his depleted air supply. 
Diver felt a need to prove 
himself, and this forced him 
to work longer than was 
safe. 
Unknown 
Pending loss of dive 
platform added pressure on 
team to get the work done. 
Notes: 
1. overall technical proficiency 




Personal statement of William Michael MCDEVITT  BU2(DV)  U 
Navy, 194-42-8217, Underwater Construction Team ONE, provide 
the Investigating Officer on 18 June 3 974. 
I have been requested to make a statement providing my knowledge 
relative to the diving incident which occurred on 11 June 1974 in 
which EOCA Ernest Bellavita was injured. 
I have also been advised: 
v 
(1) That I have the right to remain silent and make no 
statement at all; 
(2) That any statement I do make may be used as evidence 
against me in a trial by Court-Martial ,- 
(3) That I have the right to consult with a lawyer prior to 
any questioning; *       * 
(4) That I have the right to have such lawyer present during 
the interview; t. ^-x^y 
(5) That I have the right to terminate this interview at any 




ri9hts as related to me and as set forth above 
With that understanding, I have decided that I do not desire to 
remain silent, that I do not desire to consult with a lawyer at 
this time, and that I do not desire to have such a lawyer present 
during this interview.  At this time, I desire to make the 
following voluntary statement.  This statement is made with an 
understanding of my rights as previously related to me and as set 
forth above, and it is made with no threats having been made or 
promises extended to me: - 
I am a second class diver and graduated from second class diving 
school at Harbor Clearance Unit Two in Little Creek, Virginia in 
June 1973.  In July of 1973 I attended basic Underwater 
Constructor Technician School in Port Hueneme, California and 
graduated from there in September; hence after, I was assigned 
with Underwater Construction Team ONE.  Previously I have been 
civilian certified by NAUI and PADI both; got my certification on 
Guam before I became Navy certified.  I did some sport diving 
there; other than that I haven't done any sport diving.  On Guam 
the deepest I ever went was approximately 100 feet; I don't 
remember ever going any deeper than that.  I didn't keep any logs 
on my dives but I do remember that I went 100 feet.  On those 
dives, I used single 72 open-circuit scuba.  When I graduated 
from second class diving school, LT «■■■» who was the diving 
?l       Ür/n NMCB-40' told me that they had too many divers because 
they didn't anticipate so many graduating.  He told me that they 
had one guy that had to get orders somewhere and I was the only 
eligible at the time, so I was sent to NMCB-71.  Within a week 
from when I checked in to NMCB-71, they sent me PRE to UCT-1 
Other than recall dives, I helped take out the pier at Newport; 
it was approximately a two-month job.  It consisted of underwater 
sawing with a chain saw, taking out a steel railway and cleaning 
up of debris that was left on the bottom; most of the job was 
sawing and cleaning up the debris.  We were at 3 5 feet, which63 
the deepest.  That was March and April, 1974.  My diving 
experience really boils down to some sport diving during that one 
deployment to Guam, some 3 0 to 40-foot level pier removal work 
over in Newport and then about eight dives in the Azores prior to 
the day of the accident, other than the dives I made while I was 
in both Underwater Constructor School and Second Class School   I 
also went through the New London Escape Training.  Bellavita had 
also gone through this training; I hate to say that I am positive 
about anything, but I remember he was they with us; he was one of 
the guys that did real well.  As I remdmber, he did real well on 
his ascent.  As for myself, I felt that it was good experience; 
it was, you know, something that you would use maybe sometime and 
it was a good experience. 
I went straight to the Azores; we left Davisville on the 18th and 
arrived m Santa Maria on the 23rd of May.  We just helped in 
between; we stopped at Terceiras and helped with the mike boats 
momentarily until we could go over to Santa Maria.  Before the 
day of the accident, I would say I had made approximately eight 
dives; I had an estimated two hours total dive time on Santa 
Maria. 
On the day of the accident,'we left the pier in the other mike 
boat (we had one mike boat that was moored out at our job site 
and we left in the other mike boat) which took us out to the one 
that was moored.  We unloaded all our gear and all our bottles 
and immediately two divers were sent down (one was Al MHBHIHF 
and the other was LT «HBf) ; they were sent down to survey the 
cable that had been already spliced and placed in the water; they 
were to survey and find out where the split pipe was to go.  The 
split pipe was to prevent abrasion and chafing on the bottom. 
They were to mark off the spots and come back up and tell us, 
Bellavita and I Were both dressed at this time and were sitting 
on the wing walls waiting to go in and they were down inside the 
well of the mike boat.  When we took off, I felt the instructions 
were clear and I knew exactly what we were supposed to do.  I did 
not feel as though they were expecting us to do too much while we 
were down there because before a dive, they usually make sure 
that you have enough to do; they don't pressure you to get 
something done; I feel they give you more than you can do in case 
you do get done in enough time, you have enough to do won there 
so you are not a wasted dive. 
I knew the LCM-8's were going to be taken away from us.  From 
what I had heard, they were to be back in Lajes the 15th. 
Knowing this, I felt that it was pretty nip and tuck as far as 
getting the job do_ne.  I can't really remember Ernie expressing 
an opinion on it, but the opinion was pretty negative around with 
everybody, as far as getting the job done by the 15th.  I don't 
think anybody, other than ENS «HM*, thought we were going to 
get it done by then.  I just don't personally think that we could 
have gotten it done.  With respect to backup or contingencies if 
we lost the boats, they had talked with the Portuguese Port 
Captain; he had offered some of his small boats; I'm not exactly 
sure of what model or anything they were, but he said we could 
use them for dropping of split pipe and diving off of if we 
needed them.  Of course, we had our whaler and Zodiac, but it 
not really too good for handling the weight or lengths of the34 
pipe.  So, we did have that contingency.  What LT M^gy and ENS 
**■■•* had for other contingencies, I don't know. 
Knowing that we were going to lose the boats and having the 
desire to get the job done and just trying to get that very last 
bolt in while we were down there could have been a big part of 
it.  Ernie Bellavita was the type of guy that was a really 
sincere man and he didn't like to get teased that much about 
diving; he was new and he didn't like to be teased about it.  At 
the time I didn't think that much aboufc it, but after I thought 
about it for a little bit, I feel maybe the reason he stayed down 
as long as he did was because he didn't want to come up and maybe 
get razzed or have them saying, "You guys didn't any pipe on at 
all; what did you guys do down there," etc.  He may have feared, 
not really feared, but he just didn't want to put up with the 
razzing. 
After LTti^g^^ and Al «MMMMd gave us the overall picture of 
what we were to do, we waited around a few more minutes until 
they dropped split pipe for the anchor and they brought it back 
over to the mike boat, etc., then we entered the water.  When we 
entered the water, they hadn't gotten the split pipe ready to be 
put on the line; there was a small current and we were drifting 
away so we grabbed onto the whaler (one of us on each side of 
it); they had some fenders which were thrown over it and we held 
on to the fenders and we were just towed around really slow 
waiting for them to get this done.  I hadn't known it at the 
time, but when I was being towed around, I didn't use my air (and 
I just kept my head out of the water) but Ernie did, from what 
the guys in the whaler saw and the guys on the mike boat.  I 
couldn't see him because he was on the other side, but I 
understand he had his regulator in his mouth and he was breathing 
off it then.  We just held on to the whaler and they just stayed 
in the vicinity of the descent line, you know, just slowly moving 
around just waiting for them to get ready with the split pipe. 
To repeat, we were initially on the mike boat where we got 
dressed; then we jumped in and swam over to the descent line; 
they weren't ready for us (they hadn't gotten the split pipe tied 
together and ready); we were at the descent line and the whaler 
came over and we grabbed a hold of the whaler, so we didn't go 
back to the mike boat, we just patrolled around in the vicinity. 
While we were waiting in the water I didn't that notice the 
Bellavita was using his mouthpiece at that time; I'm not sure who 
told me, but it was the general opinion of people that knew 
something about it that Bellavita had his mouthpiece in his mouth 
and I also think Mills, who was the diving supervisor at the 
time, said that his thoughts were that Bellavita had his 
mouthpiece in. 
After being towed around for approximately three or four minutes, 
they r^ok us over to our descent line; I grabbed a hold of the 
descer.  .ine, Bellavita came over by me and the tool bag was 
lowered.  The tool bag was fairly heavy also.  It had bolts in 
it, ratchets, a piece of pipe for us as a ratchet, spud wrenches, 
and some fire hose which we had cut for use against chafing 
inside the split pipe.  This was handed over the side of the 
whaler; Ernie Bellavita and I each took a handle on this and65 
started our descent.  Before all this took place, Bellavita said 
he may have some trouble clearing and if he did, he would just 
hand me the bag.  I don't know why he told me that, whether he 
had a congested head or you know maybe he needed both hands to 
clear wnen he went down and he wasn't going to have the use of 
both hands; you know, he usually had one hand on the descent line 
when he went down and cleared with the other and this time he 
wouldn't have the use of his hands, so he said if he hand any 
trouble, he would give me the bag.  I had made no observation of 
him having a cold or anything at the time.  We started our 
descent and I suppose about 3 0 feet, or so below the surface he 
started having trouble clearing and he seemed to be pretty much 
troubled and the weight of this bag was taking us down; you know, 
it was nard to fight against the weight of the bag, so he gave me 
the bag.  I held on to the bag and he was clearing.  I couldn't 
hold on to the bag and stay with him both, because it was pretty 
heavy, so I went down, I assume 20 feet maybe, until I could see 
bottom and I dropped the bag so I could see where it was when it 
landed.  By that time he had gotten down to where I was  He 
still had trouble clearing, but we went down together  After I 
dropped the bag, we went down together and he had trouble 
clearing the whole time and, it was, I would say, a lengthy time 
tor descent, as far as descents go, because he did have trouble 
clearing.  I could tell he was having trouble because when you 
descend, you have to clear the pressure in the ears.  When you do 
it, one means is to hold the mask up underneath your noes and 
blow, and several time he even took his mask off and pinched his 
nose, then put his mask back on and cleared that way  That's 
somewhat of a last resort to take your mask off and pinch your 
nose  because you usually don't take your mask off for anythinq 
When he did that, I assumed he was having much difficulty 
clearing. J 
The visibility was good; we had, I assume, about 50 or 60 feet 
visibility.  We got to the bottom after what I would roughly 
estimate as three of four minutes.  Also, a personal opinion of 
myself is that when you do clear, you use a lot of air; you use a 
lot of air trying to blow and work your Eustachian tube or 
whatever trying to get your ears to equalize, because when I have 
been diving and I have had trouble clearing, I have noticed that 
I have used a lot of air just trying to clear. 
After we arrived at the bottom, we went over to our anchor line 
which was the split pipe they had dropped, and picked it up and' 
moved it approximately 50 to 75 feet, at the most, closer to the 
splice where we were to put the pipe on.  After moving it over 
we took off our fins and put them in the tool bag and then 
signaled for them to send down the split pipe. 
(I left something out in the report also:  Before I left the 
surface, they told me they had taken a sounding and the sounding 
said 108 feet, and they told me they were going to put me on a 
110-foot table which was a 20-minute stay, and that if when I 
went down and we had gone any deeper, it would be up to my 
discretion to change it to a 15-minute stay.   When we went over 
to move the anchor line, we had to go down into a small hole to 
pick up the split pipe anchor.  It wasn't over a couple of fe— 
deep, both when we had gotten on the bottom, I had checked 
Bellavita's depth gauge which said 100 and I looked at mine ana 
it had said 108.  Therefore, I put us back to a 15-minute stop 
down there because we had to go down in that hole plus I took the 
higher reading of the depth gauges.  When I decided to go from a 
20 to 15-minute schedule, I guess Bellavita still thought we were 
on a 20-mmute schedule because I didn't tell him.  Mills, our 
diving supervisor, instructed us to use a 20-minute schedule, but 
up to my discretion upon the bottom because there is current and 
the sounding line wouldn't be 100% accurate. 
When we signaled for the split pipe on the anchor line, it 
immediately came down (it's hard to estimate under water) but I 
assume about half the way, it got stuck; the two lines bided; the 
line that was attached to the split pipe and the line which it 
was sliding on separated a little bit and it was binding.  I 
shook the line while Ernie finished taking off his fins and 
putting them in the tool bag.  I shook the line and the stuck 
pipe came down 2 0 feet maybe.  I kept shaking it but it wouldn't 
come down.  Ernie went up to the split pipe; he loosened it and 
sent it down.  It came down and I took out my knife and cut the 
line off of it which was holding it on.  We carried the split 
pipe over to the break, went back over to the tool bag and got a 
piece of this fire hose and placed it into one of the sections of 
the split pipe, placed it over the cables and placed the other 
piece on top of it.  It was hard to maneuver, hard to work around 
because this had the "preform" on it, what they call a lemon; we 
were putting split pipe right over this lemon which was a bulge 
in the cable.  It was more or less a clamp to hold on the split 
pipe where the splice was.  It was hard to maneuver because 
usually the cable wasn't this big.  We had a little bit of 
trouble getting it all underneath there and getting it all 
arranged the way. we wanted it. 
When we had finished straightening this out and getting it the 
way we wanted, Ernie reached over, touched me and showed me his 
seaview gauge which read zero.  It may have been a little bit 
more than zero.  When you look at a seaview gauge, you just look 
at it to see where it is.  You know, this wasn't something that 
you try to remember every time.  I just looked over to his 
seaview and it said around zero, so I reached back and was going 
to trip his reserve for him.  I assumed that there was still air 
in his bottles and that he was still sucking, because he put his 
hand up and with the same motion I reached back there, he put his 
hand up.  I gave him a thumbs up.  The thumbs up means you wanted 
to go up, let's go up, and he still had his hand up.  In the 
diving world, thumbs up just means go up, but I thought about it 
later and down around the team down there, I had a habit of doing 
this (thumb up indication that something was OK) and I felt later 
maybe he could have misinterpreted me.  I thought maybe at the 
time, maybe he misinterpreted it, or maybe he didn't even see it 
because we were working.  Also, I feel that he may have had some 
nitrogen narcosis.  I feel that because the first time he dove 
there, I went down with him also and when he went down we were 
only 90 feet, which was the deepest we were at, and he said he 
felt some narcosis then.  He said he felt like he didn't have any 
motivation, he just wanted to look around, he didn't want to do 
the work.  He said that he just felt a little dull.  I didn' 
dive with him on his second dive, but I had heard that he sa67 
the second time down, he felt it also and I assumed this time he 
had a little narcosis and his senses may have been dulled 
somewhat then too.  I didn't experience any narcosis; I did the 
very first time I went down there, but after that I didn't 
experience any myself.  I don't know if it's just a difference in 
DOdy metabolism or what. 
When he had his hand up and signaled me, I just backed off and 
Sh^eh s^raj^teni^ the Pipe-  It wasn't one of these things 
where he looked right at me and said rio, you know, it was just 
one of these, "I am working, just keep working" deals.  I was at 
one end of the pipe and he was at the other end; we were just 
straightening it out, getting it ready to put in.  It's not 
really hard to explain how a guy's gauge can read zero and vet 
say everything is OK, because on several occasions when I've crone 
down and my gauge has been zero and I wanted to get a few more 
minutes of diving in, I would put up with the extra hard 
breathing, sucking of the air, knowing my reserve is there   I 
would just put up with the extra hard breathing before I would 
trip my reserve.  It's hard to,, suck that air out once it qets 
down  but you can do it.  I didn't think much about it at the 
time because everything seemed to be going all right; you know 
other than him having trouble clearing, everything was just a ' 
standard dive just like any other one we have done. 
After we straightened out the pipe, we went over to the tool baq 
to get our tools and our bolts out.  When we went over there  I 
remember him reaching back; I don't specifically remember lookinq 
at mm to see if he tripped his reserve or what, but I assume 
that s what he did then as he reached back.  I was digginq and I 
can remember him reaching back and assume he tripped his reserve 
We got our bolts out, got our wrenches out, got our ratchet out 
and I went over to the end of the split pipe; he put on his fins 
then; he swam over to the split pipe with me.  He picked up a 
piece of pipe to hold it together; I put a bolt underneath it and 
Dust as I was about to put the nut on, he went to me, he pointed 
to his seaview gauge.  I looked at it his time and I remember 
positively that he had less than 100 pounds, but it wasn't 
reading zero, yet he had less than 100 pounds, up I gave him a 
thumbs up.  He started up the ascent line and I didn't even 
bother to put my fins on because when you get down that low  it's 
fairly critical. 
The instructor's we received regarding our ascent were that upon 
ascent the whaler had a ten-foot line attached to the side of it 
with a shackle on it to keep it down.  We were to go over to the 
whaler and hang off there for a couple minutes; just as a 
precautionary measure; we had been doing this the whole job, just 
as a precautionary manner to eliminate any excess nitrogen which 
would be forced in our blood; we had been ding this all along. 
This was routine and we had every intention of doing it.  Now, 
this was left up to the supervisors and the people in the whaler 
also.  If we had been down there like ten minutes and we were 
supposed to be down 15 minutes, usually they wouldn't do it 
They would pull the shackle up and you would come right up to the 
boat, but if you came up and saw the whaler and it had the 
shackle down, you would hang off it and the guy in the whaler™ 
usually had a mask and he should stick his head under the water 
and signal two minutes, or whatever decompression time the 
supervisor designated.  The supervisor would time the operation 
then the guy in the whaler would pull on the line from the whaler 
and signal you to come up.  They would give you four pulls to 
come up. 
We started up the ascent line and he had his own regulator, his 
own mouthpiece and everything.  He was using his own air from his 
own jugs and everything, and he hadn't/signaled that he was 
having any trouble or anything.  We got' about half the way up, 
which I assume took a minute to get about half the way.  He 
looked like his breathing was a little bit labored.  This whole 
time, we had been together, right beside each other.  I reached 
down and turned on my f_enzy.  I have a f. enzy life vest which 
has the small bottle which you can breathe off of also in case 
you have an emergency.  I turned a little bit of air on into my 
frenzy and he reached over and grabbed the hose and pushed the 
button and started breathing off of it.  I can't say for sure 
that he pushed the button, but I feel sure he did as he knew how 
to operate a frenzy.  As far ae knowing whether I saw bubbles 
coming out to know if he was breathing, you know it wasn't one of 
those thxngs where I tried ,to remember if he was breathing or 
not, because my mouthpiece is right here in front of my face and 
my bubbles are coming out.  I wish I could say for sure, but I 
can't say for sure if he was breathing or if he was holding his 
breath.  As a rough estimate, I would say he took four or five 
breaths off of it.  He had never had any formal instruction on 
how to use the frenzy, but he and I both worked in scuba repair 
at the Team and our job was maintenance on scuba-related 
equipment.   Just before then, we had just gotten these f.enzies 
back; we only had four or five of them.  We had gotten them back 
from Bermuda and.they weren't in real good condition; they had 
salt buildup, etc., so we did some maintenance on them and 
cleaned them up, scrubbed all of the salt off of them, loosened 
them up and put some silicone on them to keep them lubricated. 
He was, if I remember correctly, there with us and he helped us 
to do this; so, he knew something about them, so he should have 
known to push the button,  I feel that he knew.  He took four or 
five breaths off of my f enzy and put it back down.  I can't 
really remember if he reached back and grabbed his regulator 
then, but I don't think he did.  All this time, we are ascending. 
I can't remember specifics of what he did, but just a moment 
after he set the f enzy down, he reached over and grabbedwy 
mouthpiece.  He didn't give me a signal that he was out of air 
and that he wanted to buddy breathe; he just reached over and 
grabbed my mouthpiece and put it in his mouth, and he did exhale 
and inhale.  He took four or five pretty deep breaths then.  I am 
positive then that he was exhaling and inhaling because I was 
watching him because he had my air, you know, and I wanted to 
make sure he just took a few breaths.  I was not hurting for air 
during this time, so as far as needing the air, I just kept on 
ascending; in fact, I'm not sure even whether I had exhausted air 
as we were ascending while he was breathing off of my regulator. 
I don't really remember.  I can see where he had his trouble, you 
know, because I, myself, don't remember concentrating on saying 
blow those bubbles out you know, exhaust them.  You know, that's 
a mistake on my part.  I assume I did because I'm all right. 
When we were coming up that line, we were hanging on to it.  69 
had one hand on the line, one hand on Ernie, and Ernie had his 
other hand on me.  We were right together, standard buddy- 
breathing procedure; we were right beside each other. 
I will start off from where he had my regulator.  I took some 
breaths off of it.  A little bit later after we ascended, I can 
remember reaching down and exhausting some of the air out of my 
frenzy, because I was rising and it was getting bigger and was 
tightening around me and I didn't want £o shoot to the surface. 
I can remember reaching up, pushing the- button and exhausting 
some of the air out of it.  When he was using the frenzy, I don't 
really remember whether he looked like he was being satisfied or 
dissatisfied by it, or really how he looked.  I remember looking 
at him when he was using it and can remember his taking a breath 
and he didn't give me any indication that he was sucking in salt 
water or was having any trouble; it was probably neglect on my 
part, but I just didn't look at him that much.  During the 
ascend, I was just watching the surface and looking at the bottom 
to make sure we were getting somewhere. 
*■ 
With respect to lessons learned or for future training in cases 
like this as to whether it would be better procedure to let your 
buddy use the regulator and the mouthpiece, and you use the 
f .enzy, I would say that I could have existed using the f .enzy, 
but I|m not saying it would be better procedure because the hose 
is going across and who knows what kind of entanglement you could 
get into.  r don't see where there would be one, but it's 
possible. 
Before I am going to give him my air, I have to know that he 
needs it or that he wants it.  The standard signal is the hand at 
the throat and to feed me air.  At no time during the dive did he 
give that signal' to me and that's why I assumed he was all right, 
but just as a precautionary measure, I guess, is the only reason' 
I put some air in my f enzy.  The little bottle that goes into 
the frenzy does not have a gauge on it.  This gets filled before 
each dive.  After the dive, you blow up your vest and get rid of 
all of the salt water that may be in it and you leave your vest 
blown up to make sure when you come back the next morning that it 
is still the same way you left it.  Then you know that you don't 
have any trouble with holes in it or anything.  You fill the 
frenzy bottle by taking it from the vest and putting it on a 
regular size bottle, opening the valves and letting the air 
cascade into the bottle.  In the way of time, I believe the 
frenzy would be good for a couple of minutes. 
After he took four or five breaths from me and I had exhausted 
some of the air from this f enzy, he took the regulator out of 
his mouth and he placed it right back in my mouth because I had 
one hand on the ascent line and my other hand on him.  I reached 
up and straightened it and everything.  I had just taken a couple 
of breaths when we hit that mooring line.  I just felt it 
brushing up against my shoulder.  We were pretty close together 
and i'm not really sure where it hit him, whether it hit him 
right on the head or it got caught between his head and his 
bottles.  I thought that's where it did.  You know, I couldn't 
.Lit ; 
exactly see because of the bubbles and because he was flaili -0 
it^ ?A       remember looking down and he was flailing a liLujL 
with the same instant that I looked down and made a movement 
*™*r?t  h1im' he "as gone already.  He has gotten himself free 
from the line and was on the way to the surface, so I am sure he 
couldn't have been tangled in the line more than five seconds.  I 
don t remember specifically whether he was kicking his feet, but 
as rast as he was going from the mooring line to the surface, I'm 
SrH t  W?E'  H%had his f^PPers on, but I didn't.  Just before 
he broke the surface, he ripped of his mask.  The line didn't 
£™ h??%?«   °l   '   5herV;\the Possibility that the line could 
have hit his mask and it filled with water or it could have 
knocked it cockeyed or something.  All I remember was looking at 
Ji"Sj just before he broke surface, he ripped off his mask  My 
ttjflil  f  5h; ?oori?9 line was that I don't believe it was more 
SA  £e5tv, el°W the surface-  Everybody was thinking that's 
where he had his troubles, but I personally don't feel Ehat's 
where he had his troubles. 
The normal procedure on the up would be to look over to the 
whaler for the shackle that is hanging down and head over to it. 
At the time, I didn't think about it; I probably would have 
tnought about it as we neared the surface, but with the fact that 
we were buddy breathing then, I didn't think about it   ifwould 
£o3n ?eS? VeJY SaSy f°r US t0 surface and then just go right back down to ten feet.  I don't think this dive was that critical 
because we hadn't even been there our full 15 minutes. 
When he reached the surface, he had his mask off. I reached the 
surface just a moment behind him and when I came up, he said »I 
fa£ of fufked.myself up!«  I could not see any expression on his 









'' ?COtt said he came fairly far out of the water ' 
and he knew something was wrong, but anyway, the whaler was over 
there ]ust a moment after we reached the surface.  I started 
swimming towards the whaler; I swam away from Ernie because the 
procedure was for the whaler to come in between us and grab, and 
we take off our weight belts and our tanks.  The guys in the 
whaler would help us and assist us, and we would climb over 
either side of the whaler.  I remember Bellavita was movinq 
towards the whaler and I can't remember anything unusual about 
the way he was swimming.  It was just a matter of seconds before 
the whaler was there.  They were right over there by us and just 
as he was going around the front of the whaler and the whaler was 
coming between us, I heard him say, »No, I think I really did," 
ana Trostle that was on the whaler with Scott came over to help 
me on and I told him to go help Bellavita because I think he hurt 
nimself   Trostle went over and helped Bellavita and I was in the 
water there a while just hanging on, and then I took off my 
weight belt, put it in the whaler and I looked up over the edge 
and I saw that they had Ernie laying over the front of the thing 
fu  Juf?-Srured he must really be hurt bad, so I climbed up into 
the whaler myself and I had one shoulder strap of my tanks on and 
I climbed up into the whaler, and held onto my tanks and then I 
pulled them up in.  When I got up to the front of the whaler, he 
was going out of consciousness then; he was groaning a little bit 
and just slipped away you know into unconsciousness, and when 
got there Scott was hitting him in the face a couple of timesTI 
shaking him and he was saying, "Ernie, where does it hurt, tell 
me Ernie where is the pain"; you know, "What do you feel?" and 
then he went unconscious.  They took the whaler right over to the 
mike boat, picked up the corpsman, Hastings, picked up Mills who 
was the diving supervisor (he brought the Diving Manual with 
him); left off Trostle; we also goth the Ambu bag; we started 
right in for the pier.  The corpsman put the Ambu bag on 
Bellavita and was trying to revive him, and I looked through the 
diving manual until I found the treatment tables and I didn't 
know exactly which table we were going*-to use; so I gave it to 
Scott who looked up the table that he planned on using.  When we 
reached the pier (the time it took was 20 minutes or so; someone 
said 23 or something like that; I don't really remember; it 
seemed like a long time).  LTJG Parisi was already on the dock 
there waiting so we just beached the whaler; I pulled up the 
engine and Mills just took the boat right up on the concrete; we 
pulled Ernie out of the boat; they had the little stretcher that 
comes out of the chamber already down there waiting for us; there 
were Portuguese all around that helped us get him out of the boat 
and up to the chamber; we set him half way into the chamber, cut 
his wet suit top off of him; pulled his wet suit top off of him 
and set him right in the chamber and started the treatment.  This 
was my first experience, but the treatment went very well; they 
did everything according to the book; they did a fine job as far 
as the treatment goes. 
Going back a little, I didn't hear him say it, but Scott said 
that just before he climbed into the boat (he didn't climb into 
the boat, they said they dragged him; they pulled him up in the 
boat), just before when he was at the edge of the whaler, he 
said, "My hand's numb, I can't feel my hand."  Scott also said 
that some time when they were pulling him in or when they had him 
in, he said, "My legs are numb, I can't feel my left side, 
"something to that effect, that he had numbness in his legs, but 
other than that, that was all that he said.  I didn't hear any of 
this because I was down in the water. 
I was with him during the whole procedure up even until he died; 
I assisted in bringing up the compressor and we had to rig 
fittings to go from the compressor right to the volume tanks on 
the chamber and our compressor couldn't keep up with the air that 
they were using in the chamber, so SW1 Reynolds was there so he 
and I, and I don't know who all helped, but I remember he was 
there and he was one of the main men who was helping in getting 
air for the chamber.  We jury-rigged a setup to run some line 
directly from double 77's to cascade into the volume tanks so 
that in case we really needed it, we could fill up these volume 
tanks on the recompression chamber from our scuba bottles; we had 
only used four of them on the dive, so all of our scuba jugs were 
filled, probable about ten or 12 of them.  They also found 
another compressor up at the airport.  They started making 
provisions to move the chamber up there. 
/When Bellavita was in the chamber, he was screaming.  I don't 
remember how long after he was in the chamber, that he regained 
consciousness or semi-consciousness; he was screaming for help 
he?pSme"n9hehd?f '? ,the.effect' "°h my God, I'm going to die.. 
neip me , he did a lot of screaming - it was orettv bad   »  '- 
CASSIS; yiu^^ir ?,ch? ~. ^ J^^ eh« i ^J-^J-'a"-Lt: ten you the details; they loqqed evervfh-i no Tn 
we«°n aSd ^t of00"" ?r°bably tel1 >">" th*^tTl7of«Ln  he 
shootin"^'^^^^! f°r hi™ -d-:- «» s-e^enThe was 
surface  ?'  „o  tL  , ^'°? ° " Hl? raaSk just be£ore breaking ho til     T C   ?      I dldn c know where he was - I knew where 
was Still »=r 5e "" at the line' but „hen he hit the line I 
S^n-^^&Ä'S" SÄ^^lST fie t ff 
Se^-L^aSfx^oui^s^e^^us? fl~u ^ L f^ jSt 
out and he was just moving really fast    ' 3j  t'S^v" *" ^ 
Sitethentlinrrhl himtand hS 2" 3°nS-      X 3u-t Sa.-^M «hen he ih»i- hLri  ' e 3us  stopped.  At the time I wasn't positive 
what had happened or that tilery was a line there that he Mt  T 
Knk  iLlimetning.brUfh UP gainst my shoulder.  I didn^t ' 
and hi hit It ah5r? I  th^ 'm0°ring line-"  X 3UEt brushed it off 
I lojt nlm Jomentari!^ S'Ä'.JÄe^ ^s^st^r ." 
l'wasn^^otÄ  suS^  Ld^lo^ 3!  ^  ^'"^ 
^urfLT   maekltLl *™   ^d  ne^slre^lndlusrinot^o^the^ 
f"-" efore he^re^d'thf surfaced ^re^ef » 
i„° S9 S    brm. vividly and he took his mask and rippeS it off • 
everything0* lion'tV^ ??\the WaCer out of hi^face and"' 
When^htt  thedSoring°xinef  ^f teTne^f t^  °f "tei .°* "^ faqt.       rpKo   ,      .      'yulJ-ia   xi ,   arc r  he   left,   he  was  movina Drett-v 
like   that        whoJ  K stronf man.      He  wasn't  weak  or  anything like  that.     When he  got   m  the  water,   he  really worked. 
SÜnV*?  nSVer any stru9Srling between Ernie  and myself    other 
than he  took my mouthpiece  from me  and  I  didn't  think anv?hina 
SUri^6hCaUSe  ^had a±r and  if  he  was  havJng troubl^it  Sas 
neier ? struSaleUb^haVe  "  ^  air  aS  he  Wan^-     TnSre  was 
ut was  whin   ?? ?•?  5üeen  US;   the  °nly  time  he  seemed  to get  shook 
h? ^HL   ?en       J11}   that  moorin9  line,   and   I  personally  fiel   that 
think  th^"1?;   hS  ^r  fc?at   something  was   thematter     V don't 
jus?  fee?  tnat^  ^  ^  ^   the  moorin9  ^ne   that  did  i?       I 
whJn  hJ  Jit   tL   ?•      SK'   YOU  k?°W'   he   knew  s°^thing was  wrong 
ho  =i        5     u   5e  line  because  he  did   flail   so much       I   think  that 
if  herhaHyHhad-SOr  difficulty before   that  point        I   don't  know if  he  had  difficulty,   physical   difficulty but   I   feel   that  he  knew 
nehawasS°rSnnin? "t  P5ySically ^  -tte/with me^l  dSn't^hiSk 
became  hSJnL  hi  h  ^  *?*  he  Panicked  or  anything  like  that 
wo?rv aboSt   tW   =   had,my air  r^ht   the^  and he  didn't  have  to 
worry about   that  aspect,   but  well,    I   don't  know,   but   I   think  that 
maybe he probably held his breath part of the way up or when 
had his own air, he was holding his breath, hoping the air * 73 
expand and then he would get some good breaths, and he held his 
breath.  But, I don't remember seeing him hold his breath; I 
can't really say what happened; that's just my opinion. 
I was a known fact that he used a lot of air; he breathes pretty 
hard and pretty heavy and deep; maybe the pressure had something 
to do with it.  He didn't use a token amount of air --it wasn't 
like a whole set of jugs in a half hour or something like that on 
the surface, but usually he would be one of the first ones to run 
out of air.  On the other dive that I had with him previously, at 
more like 90 feet, he did not run out of air then, but somebody 
said he breathed out a whole set before they completed their 
tasks on another dive.  He almost ran out of air when he was with 
me; we made an 80 or 90-foot dive; we installed the shackling 
into the mooring system which we put it down there.  I didn't go 
on reserve then, but I don't think he did either; I can't really 
remember. 
When we came to surface, I don't know what my tanks were 
registering because I didn't lpok at my seaview; you know, when 
there's an emergency like that, you don't think of everything. 
With respect to being in a situation where two guys are down at 
the bottom and one is deciding to stay too long and the other 
buddy is saying let's go up and, for some unknown reason , the 
other guy is electing to stay, and what options would the other 
buddy have to try and get this other guy to come up if he has 
lost his judgment --- well, one, you can go ahead and let him run 
out of air and if you have a sufficient amount of air, you could 
buddy breathe with him the whole way up; or you could start 
taking off and hope that he would com with you.  It's really hard 
to say.  When a man trips his reserve, he is supposed to start 
his ascent then.'  I wasn't persistent in saying to go to the 
surface; probably it was a big mistake on my part in not being 
persistent to go up, but I felt the man knows his capabilities; 
he is a diver; he knows what he can do as a diver.  We both were 
inexperienced divers.  He graduated from diving school just after 
I did and neither one of us was that experienced.  In school, in 
Little Creek, they made a point of it for us to know that when 
you tried your reserve when you were diving, to leave the bottom, 
and if you should ever run out of air on the bottom and you trip 
your reserve and there's not air, we would practice free ascents 
-- just in case the situation ever happened.  I don not recall 
any specific instruction that tells buddies that when you are 
going up buddy breathing to be looking for air bubbles, to watch 
tat particular situation.  Usually, the instructors would 
probable hopefully assume that you would do that.  Then again, a 
lot of times in school, you can't even see you buddy because the 
water is so dirty; you can't see him, you can't see bubbles. 
Maybe if we were diving in clear water in school. 
As a person, Bellavita was a good guy; he was one of those guys 
that everybody liked; he was always joking --he was Italian and 
everybody teased him about being Italian and he would joke right 
back.  I don't feel that there was anybody that didn't really 
like him.  As far as his physical condition, he wasn't in real 
good shape, but I don't think he was in bad shape -- he smoke -, 
nad an occasional beer now and then, nothing excessive.  T '4 
night before this dive he was sleeping.  I know that because 
previously we had been on the splice team and I'm not exactly 
sure, out I think he was out there 34 hours straight the night 
before.  Not the nigh before the accident, but the previous 
night.  We went out during the day and relieved the splice team 
tnat was out there; we rigged our cable and everything, and did 
the splice that night and it carried into the next day.  We 
üidn t get off the mike boats until something like 4:00; well he 
^£^%nu   bit earlier -- he might h£ve been out there only 
about 3 0 hours  He took the whaler and'went back in to get some 
guys and let them bring the whaler out, and they just told him to 
just go ahead and stay there, but somewhere in the area of 3 0 
T !^!\      been up straight and he went back to the hotel and 
i didn t see him, but I knew that he went back to sleep because 
earl»  ^    * 9°°d ni9ht's  sleeP last night, I went to bed 
I didn't notice any apparent discomfort from him sitting his suit 
fr/°u 1°nH' but the doc' the corpsmen two are all pretty close 
said that Ernie had said that.he insisted they would let him get 
io^    ?t because he was feeling a little queasy and when you 
?S^in ?u ?a^er' lt: disaPRears for some reason.  The corpsman 
told me that Ernie had said I wish they would let me get in'the 
water, I feel a little queasy, a little sick. 
l^eqailmeT  ?CT °NE USes is 9°od equipment.  I feel it was good 
oerore the deployment; we maintain everything up and ready for 
our deployments, and when we get back from our deployments, 
everything comes in whether it's bad or not, everything comes 
back in (as far as SCUBA gear) and we clean it all up and give it 
overall maintenance, make sure it's silicone, make sure there's 
??rTl!°rn.Parts-  They are a little tight on money, they have been 
tignt with money, trying to get money out of whoever they try to ' 
get it out of, I assume CBLANT.  You know, I am one-sided because 
I would like to have more stuff than I do have (mostly parts) ; in 
tact we didn't take any regulator parts with us this time because 
we shipped a lot of our stuff to Virginia and we just took spare 
regulators instead of taking the parts with us.  We had 18 
K^i??-!and that's a 9°od amount for the amount of diving we did, 
■5u u".  '   • 1S in char9e of SCUBA repair, had extra regulators 
witn him seaview gauges, etc. 
Bellayita was not wearing his own regulator,- he was wearing 
Scott s.  His regulator had gone bad; the rubber mouthpiece  had 
a nole mit.  We did not have a spare mouthpiece, so he used 
Scott s that day.  I don't know when he discovered it was bad. 
As far as Scott's regulator, I have a log down there and if I 
maintained it, I have it logged in my log, but I am pretty sure I 
didn t do it.  In fact, I think Scott worked on his a little bit 
himself  He is fairly knowledgeable about it; I think he set the 
OBP on his himself.  I remember his saying something about it was 
really easy to breathe off of his because he had set the OBP that 
way that it would free flow a little bit at the surface because 
he had adjusted his OBP that way. 
With respect to being a little short of maintenance dollars, I 
don't know of a case where we asked for more spare parts or 
repair parts where we couldn't get them.  One time, we put in75 
big stack of request chits for repair parts and Senior Chief 
called me in, and I assume he called Mills in also, and asked me 
why did we want all of this gear.  I just told him with the new 
man coming in and in view of UCT taking over all of the divers 
that we were going to need them, and it was better to have them 
than run out of something and miss something and not have them 
and have to wait on them.  There were no situations over in the 
Azores with any equipment that we would like to have done 
something to, but couldn't because of lack of parts of SCUBA 
gear.  In fact, we had several bottles'-that had gone down and had 
leaks in them or something but we just try to repair them and we 
had one bottle that was bad so we tried to use the parts from it. 
We tried to repair them, but they didn't seem to hold air, so we 
just put them back in the locker.  They are pretty picky when it 
comes to things like that.  If gear isn't up, they don't even 
fuss with it.  We wait until we get back to the States to repair 
it; in the meantime, we use whatever we have.  As I said before, 
we had spare regulators, etc.; there wasn't really a demand for 
parts and for the regulators to be fixed over there because we 
had spares and we weren't hurting for equipment, as far as that 
goes. 
As far as any recommendations or opinions that might be helpful 
in the future to help prevent any more accidents of this nature. 
I don't have any because actually right now I don't know from the 
autopsy what he actually died from.  I don't really know, I think 
he had some nitrogen narcosis and maybe he shouldn't have been 
diving that day because he wasn't feel good.  As far as I know, 
he was not taking any medication of any kind. 
With respect to the time as to when I went down and came up, I 
had set my watch for a 2 0-minute dive.  I think it was in the 
area of somewhere around 20 until one when we took off, I can't 
really remember right now.  I set it for 20 minutes but we didn't 
stay even close to our full 20 minute planned dive.  I remember 
looking and seeing I was five minutes away from actual ascent 
time.  I remember seeing that we had five minutes left when we 
were trying to get the belts in (five minutes from 15 minutes) . 
When we went into the hole after the piece of pipe, I moved the 
dial on my watch to a 15 minute dive, but I know we didn't stay 
our actual 15 minutes, but I don't actually know what the total 
time of the dive was.  I didn't even think about finding out what 
it was, but I think we started our descent in the area of around 
20 until one. 
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